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CONGRESS UNDERESTIMATED:
THE CASE OF THE WORLD BANK
By Kristina Daugirdas*
International organizations undermine democracy, or so their critics charge: not only do
international organizations themselves operate undemocratically,1 but they undercut demo-
cratic governance within their member states. In particular, when states participate in inter-
national organizations, they lose control over policy outcomes because each state must share
decision-making authority with other member states.2 And within member states, national
legislatures—the bodies specifically designed to be responsive to popular control—are margin-
alized.3 Legislatures lack direct influence over international organizations and also have little
influence over the executive branch’s interactions with such organizations.4
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Many thanks to Tabatha Abu-El Haj, Sam
Bagenstos, Nick Bagley, Michael Barr, Deb Burand, John Ciociari, Sherman Clark, Alicia Davis, David Fontana,
Monica Hakimi, Daniel Halberstam, Scott Hershovitz, Don Herzog, Jim Krier, Nina Mendelson, Julian Morten-
son, Richard Primus, Steve Ratner, Margo Schlanger, Paul Stephan, Ed Swaine, and the participants at the ASIL
International Organizations and International Law in Domestic Courts workshops and the Wharton–Colorado
University Junior International Law Scholars Workshop for helpful comments and conversations. My special
appreciation to John Broderick for excellent research assistance, Seth Quidachay-Swan at the University of Mich-
igan Law Library, and the individuals who agreed to be interviewed for this project.
1 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2017–18 (2004) (“The
existing international governance organizations are famous for their undemocratic opacity, remoteness from pop-
ular or representative politics, elitism, and unaccountability. International governance institutions and their officers
tend to be bureaucratic, diplomatic, technocratic—everything but democratic.”); Eric Stein, International Integra-
tion and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AJIL 489, 491 (2001) (international organizations are “considered
‘undemocratic’ since they operate with little transparency or public and parliamentary scrutiny”); Detlev F. Vagts,
International Agreements, the Senate, and the Constitution, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 143, 154 (1997).
2 See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in DEMOCRACY’S
EDGES 19, 22 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Gordon eds., 1999); Karl Kaiser, Transnational Relations as a Threat
to the Democratic Process, 25 INT’L ORG. 706, 714 (1971) (“As the number and activities of international orga-
nizations expand, an area grows in which major decisions are made without much democratic control by the peoples
and institutions which are affected or which support these activities financially.”); John O. McGinnis, Medellı́n and
the Future of International Delegation, 118 YALE L.J. 1712, 1714 (2009). At the same time, states participating in
international organizations gain traction on problems that would be difficult or impossible for them to address indi-
vidually. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71 Law & CONTEMP. PROBS.
115 (2008); Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo & Andrew Moravcsik, Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism,
63 INT’L ORG. 1, 4 (2009) (“This is the state of the current debate: critics of multilateralism point to the ways in
which international institutions undermine democracy; defenders respond by stressing pragmatic benefits.”).
3 CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 100 (2013) (identifying concern
that international organizations will empower the executive branch at the expense of the legislature); JOSÉ E. ALVA-
REZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 396 (2005) (same); DAN SAROOSHI, INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS 15 (2005) (same).
4 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 1, at 490 (“A new level of normative activity superimposed on national democratic
systems makes citizen participation more remote, and parliamentary control over the executive, notoriously loose
in foreign affairs matters, becomes even less effective.”).
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Within the United States, this account reflects a familiar story about Congress’s feeble
participation in foreign affairs. Under the standard account, when it comes to foreign affairs,
the executive branch is both well suited and highly motivated to take the initiative.5 By
contrast, Congress is unmotivated and ineffective.6 At best, it is relegated to a reactive role.7
When questions arise concerning the proper allocation of constitutional authority between
the president and Congress—as they often do in foreign affairs—the executive branch is in a
good position to assert and defend the president’s constitutional prerogatives.8 Congress is
hobbled, however, by collective action problems as well as by the high transaction costs of
responding both to the executive’s unilateral actions and to the constitutional arguments
made by the executive branch.9 Moreover, the longer that an international organization is
around, the more profound the shift to the executive branch is thought to be: although the
Senate (in the case of a treaty) or both houses of Congress (in the case of a congressional-
executive agreement) initially authorize U.S. participation, the executive branch alone repre-
sents the United States once the organization is up and running. From that point on, the
executive branch’s actions are subject to little scrutiny by either Congress or the courts.10 The
president may consequently find that international organizations provide an opportunity to
pursue policies that Congress would affirmatively oppose—if only it had the opportunity to
weigh in.11
Using the World Bank (Bank) as a case study, this article casts doubt on the empirical foun-
dation for the claim that international organizations undermine democracy by undermining
legislatures. The article also argues that the conventional wisdom about the executive branch’s
dominance in foreign affairs may be overstated—especially outside the context of wars and
5 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 132, 161–65 (1999); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION (1990)
(titling chapter 5 “Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Executive Initiative and Congres-
sional Acquiescence”).
6 This perception of Congress has been forged largely through analyses of its performance during national secu-
rity crises that may, or actually do, involve military action. See, e.g., KOH, supra note 5, at 117–33. Some commen-
tators argued that presidential dominance, built up by wars and crises, has eroded Congress’s ability to check exec-
utive dominance in foreign and domestic affairs alike. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE
UNBOUND (2010); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010).
7 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 955–56 (2005); Paul B. Stephan,
Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 681, 697–99
(1997).
8 See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV.
411 (2012).
9 See Moe & Howell, supra note 5, at 144–46; Bradley & Morrison, supra note 8, at 438–44; Julian Davis
Mortenson, Executive Power and the Discipline of History, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 377, 412–16 (2011).
10 Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 188–89 (1999) (describing
courts’ “extreme deference to the executive” in foreign affairs as “enabl[ing] a sizable amount of executive activity,
having major ramifications on domestic interests, to remain completely beyond judicial reach and effective public
scrutiny”); Stein, supra note 1, at 531 (describing lack of parliamentary scrutiny of international organizations).
11 See, e.g., Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 18 (1998) (suggesting that international financial institutions offer the executive branch
a way to circumvent Congress’s preferences on distributing foreign aid); see also ALVAREZ, supra note 3, at 396
(“[T]reaty-making may enhance the power of executive branches within governments, at the expense of national
parliaments or legislatures, and sometimes permits the executive branch to accomplish legal changes that it alone
could not accomplish or, in those states that accord treaties superior status to a national constitution, even to take
legal actions otherwise not authorized to any branch of government.”).
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crises.12 Over the past forty years, Congress has undertaken persistent and often successful
efforts to shape day-to-day U.S. participation in the Bank, a key international organization.
Some of Congress’s methods for doing so may contravene constitutional limits on its authority,
but the executive branch’s protestations to that effect have not held Congress back.
By focusing on Congress’s ongoing role in influencing the Bank’s operations, this article
addresses a perplexing oversight in the literature concerning the democratic accountability of
international organizations in the United States. To the extent that this literature considers
Congress at all, it has focused narrowly on two discrete points: Congress’s role in the initial
decision to authorize U.S. participation in international organizations and its role in imple-
menting new international legal obligations that these organizations generate.13 But limiting
the inquiry to these discrete points misses much of what is important. First, international orga-
nizations are durable institutions with long lives; the Bank, for example, has been around since
1945. Concerns about democratic accountability do not wane over time. To the contrary, they
are likely to grow more acute.14 Second, many international organizations, including the Bank,
conduct their mandated activities without generating new international norms that bind their
member states, with the consequence that their activities do not raise the question of whether
implementing legislation is necessary.15
To understand the nature and extent of Congress’s involvement in shaping Bank policy, one
should start with the U.S. Code. Congress has enacted scores of instructions regarding the
Bank. Some of these instructions direct the U.S. representatives at the Bank how to vote. Oth-
ers direct the U.S. representatives at the Bank to promote or oppose a specified policy. The
Department of the Treasury’s compilation of legislative mandates that govern interactions
with the Bank and other international financial institutions runs nearly 250 pages.16
These legislated instructions are striking for at least two reasons. First, the obstacles that hin-
der congressional action have not prevented Congress from adopting legislation regarding
the Bank—and from doing so on a regular, ongoing basis over a period exceeding forty years.
12 As treaties cover an increasingly broad and diverse range of subjects, wars and crises are making up a smaller
share of the foreign affairs field. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Admin-
istrative Law? 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 63–64 (2005) (observing “explosive development of a great variety
of international economic and social regulatory regimes” in recent decades).
13 See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1308–12 (arguing that congressional-exec-
utive agreements approved by majorities of both houses are more democratic than treaties approved by two-thirds
of the Senate); McGinnis, supra note 2; Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, The Structural Constitution,
and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STANFORD L. REV. 1557 (2003); JULIAN KU & JOHN YOO, TAMING GLOBALIZA-
TION 87–112 (2012). An exception is Anne-Marie Slaughter, who describes growing efforts to develop interna-
tional networks of legislatures and legislators to influence international organizations. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER,
A NEW WORLD ORDER 104–30 (2004).
14 Stein, supra note 1, at 531 (“At the national level, experience has shown that the legitimacy of a state’s adhesion
to an IGO [intergovernmental organization], grounded in the act of approval by an elected legislature, dissipates
quickly as the national delegation, appointed and instructed by the national executive, often acts within the orga-
nization in alliance with other delegations and IGO staff, and finds itself with little actual supervision by, or account-
ability to, the legislature.”).
15 More precisely, the Bank does not impose obligations on member states unless they borrow from it. Laurence
Boisson de Chazournes, Policy Guidance and Compliance: The World Bank Operational Standards, in COMMIT-
MENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 289
(Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). For other examples of international organizations that do not impose binding obliga-
tions, see, for example, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra; Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Con-
cept of International Delegation, 71 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 14–16 (2008).
16 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY COMPILATION OF LEGISLATIVE MANDATES
APPLYING TO U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE IFIS (10th ed. 2010).
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Second, the legislated instructions reflect a constitutionally contested assertion of authority
over decisions that would otherwise be made unilaterally by the executive branch.17 Every pres-
ident since George H. W. Bush has issued signing statements objecting that these legislated
instructions impinge on the president’s exclusive constitutional authority to engage in inter-
national negotiations.18
Of course, it is one thing to legislate voting or negotiation instructions. It is another thing
to see that they are carried out, especially when the president has asserted constitutional objec-
tions. And it is still more challenging for Congress to motivate the executive branch to pursue
the policies underlying the legislated instructions with any kind of energy, enthusiasm, or seri-
ous intent. And yet, when it comes to voting instructions, Congress’s track record is good. In
Republican and Democratic administrations and during periods of both unified and divided
government, the executive branch has voted consistently with Congress’s instructions.19 Con-
gress has enjoyed some significant successes in spurring the executive branch to embrace spe-
cific policy shifts. Most remarkably, Congress succeeded in turning Reagan administration
officials into effective advocates of reforming the Bank’s approach to environmental issues.
Congress’s most important tool for achieving these outcomes is a familiar source of leverage:
threatening to cut the Bank’s funding.20 Congress has deployed this threat repeatedly and suc-
cessfully, both to spur action on particular policy goals and to defend its constitutional author-
ity to issue negotiation and voting instructions.21 Monitoring, while less dramatic than threats
to cut funding, has also proved an important tool to ensure that the executive branch under-
takes more than rote implementation of Congress’s legislated instructions. In addition to hold-
ing hearings and requiring the executive branch to draft reports, Congress has successfully pur-
sued changes in the Bank’s transparency policies that have reinforced Congress’s ability to
monitor not only the Bank but also executive branch officials’ interactions with it.22
In short, critics have underestimated Congress. At least when it comes to the United States
and the Bank, there is little foundation for the claim that participation in an international orga-
nization allows the executive branch to sideline Congress. Congress can and does protect its
institutional prerogatives, and its active involvement in this especially important international
organization has been ongoing—the rule rather than the exception. There is also reason to
think that Congress might enjoy similar success in other international organizations: the
feature of the Bank that has been most important to Congress’s success—the Bank’s regular
17 See infra part II.
18 These constitutional debates have received surprisingly little attention in the literature about the Bank. See
infra note 53 and accompanying text.
19 Daryl Levinson and Rick Pildes argue that the dynamics between Congress and the president are largely deter-
mined by whether government is divided or unified by political party. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Sep-
aration of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006). Political party affiliation appears to be relatively
unimportant to understanding dynamics regarding the Bank. Congress has enacted numerous voting and nego-
tiation instructions during periods of unified government. The most prominent fight over the constitutionality of
Congress’s legislated instructions took place during a period of unified government at the beginning of President
Obama’s first term. And Congress has legislated instructions that have been energetically implemented during peri-
ods of divided government.
20 See infra part III.
21 See infra part IV.
22 See infra part V.
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need for funding—is shared by most international organizations in which the United States
participates.23
This article does not set forth a theory of the democratic accountability of international orga-
nizations, but it does highlight some reasons why caution is warranted in assessing the impli-
cations of congressional participation for the democratic accountability of international orga-
nizations. The negative claim that international organizations undermine democracy by
enfeebling national legislatures suggests two positive claims: that legislative participation is
necessary to cure democratic deficits and that active legislative participation actually would
cure democratic deficits. Neither is obviously correct. On the first point, legislative participa-
tion may not be necessary to cure democratic deficits because, in the absence of congressional
involvement, the executive branch delineates Bank policy and is itself headed by a democrat-
ically accountable actor—the president. The president’s foreign policy views play a role in his
election and influence the policies that the Treasury Department pursues regarding the Bank.
An active Congress may diminish the president’s ability to pursue his chosen foreign policy
strategies and to achieve his foreign policy goals.
With respect to the second claim, this article’s account of congressional participation in
shaping Bank policy highlights some counterintuitive tensions between congressional activism
and democratic accountability.24 The tools that Congress has deployed to shape Bank policy
are noteworthy in part because they do not necessarily involve the virtues commonly associated
with congressional involvement—namely, deliberation and a high level of consensus among
a large group of electorally accountable individuals reflecting the views of geographically dis-
crete constituencies.25 Since the 1980s, the overwhelming majority of legislated instructions
have been adopted as riders to large appropriations bills. Such riders are generally not the prod-
uct of a transparent, inclusive, and deliberative process.26 Likewise, the threats to cut funding
that proved so effective at motivating the executive branch can be credibly deployed by a single
senator or representative, provided that he or she chairs the right committee or subcommittee.
These tools for influencing Bank policy allow Congress to avoid the collective action problems
that often hamper it in the foreign affairs field.27 But the more that Congress relies on tools that
engage only a small handful of its members, the harder it is to see congressional action as ensur-
ing that the positions staked out by the executive branch reflect the will of the American people.
That said, by carving out a role for itself in shaping day-to-day Bank policy, Congress has
cracked open a closed process within the executive branch to a richer range of input and a wider
23 See infra part VI (addressing the generalizability of the Bank example).
24 Other commentators have argued that international organizations may enhance liberal democratic governance
even if they do undermine legislatures. See Keohane, supra note 2 (arguing that participation in international orga-
nizations enhances democracy by limiting the power of special interest factions, protecting individual rights, and
improving the quality of democratic deliberation); Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International
Economic Law, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 841 (2003).
25 See, e.g., Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217,
1249 (2006).
26 See, e.g., Jack Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 88 (2006) (“riders . . . often
fly below the political radar, placed in the bill by a few connected members of Congress”); Thomas McGarity,
Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671 (2012) (describing
riders as “the tools of special-interest lobbyists with access to key congressional players”).
27 See supra note 9.
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circle of democratically accountable officials.28 Congress has identified problems at the Bank
of which the executive branch was unaware, and has called them to the administration’s atten-
tion. Congress’s instructions (including those adopted as appropriations riders) have contrib-
uted to both public debates and substantive outcomes by requiring executive branch officials
to publicly defend—and perhaps rethink—their preferred policy outcomes and methods for
pursuing them.29 Congress’s involvement thus can contribute positively to both the substance
of U.S. policy and the process by which it is determined.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE WORLD BANK
What is commonly referred to as the World Bank is actually a cluster of five legally distinct
international organizations. The two most significant are the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA).
For readability’s sake, this article will refer to the IBRD and IDA together as “the World Bank,”
or Bank, distinguishing between them only as necessary. The IBRD, along with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), was established in 1945 following negotiations in Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire.30 The IBRD’s primary activity is extending loans to governments
for development purposes; today the IBRD describes its overriding goal as “to overcome pov-
erty and improve standards of living.”31
In order to lend money, of course, a bank needs capital. The IBRD gets funding from two
main sources: directly from its member states and by selling debt securities in the private capital
markets.32 Income from the IBRD’s loans constitutes a third source.33 Significantly, this
financing structure means that the IBRD does not require annual contributions from its mem-
ber states.
The IBRD’s member states supervise and direct its activities through two bodies: the Board
of Governors and the executive directors. Every member state is represented on the Board of
28 As Kathryn Lavelle describes, shifting constellations of interest groups have both supported, and sought to
influence, the Bank and the IMF since their establishment in 1945. Quite often these interest groups have
demanded that Congress pursue policy changes at the Bank and the IMF as a condition of their support for funding
these institutions. The extent to which Congress has embraced these demands for change has varied over time. To
explain this variation, Lavelle focuses on exogenous shifts in the international political economy and on internal
changes in how Congress operates. KATHRYN LAVELLE, LEGISLATING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
(2011).
29 Cf. Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 15, 32–33 (2006) (describing how public disagreement among U.S. agencies over negotiations concerning inter-
national financial regulation can help the public identify key issues in dispute and can contribute to more reasoned
decision making).
30 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 UNTS 39; Articles
of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1440, 2
UNTS 134 [hereinafter IBRD Agreement].
31 WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 2011: YEAR IN REVIEW 2 (2011).
32 Since 1946, members have paid into the Bank about $11 billion in capital. This amount represents only a small
fraction of each member’s capital stock subscription; the rest is subject to call should the Bank become unable to
pay its obligations. IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. II, §5. The callable capital has helped the Bank to maintain
a triple-A rating since 1959. See World Bank, How IBRD Is Financed, at http://go.worldbank.org/LAG4BZ1VD1;
SARAH BABB, BEHIND THE DEVELOPMENT BANKS 35 (2009).
33 In fiscal year 2011, the Bank’s profits totaled $996 million. WORLD BANK, supra note 31. This income covers
the IBRD’s operating expenses, goes into reserves to strengthen the Bank’s balance sheet, and provides an annual
transfer to the IDA. See World Bank, supra note 32 .
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Governors, usually by that state’s secretary of treasury or equivalent.34 As a formal matter
this body is vested with “[a]ll the powers of the Bank,”35 but in practice the executive directors
run the bank.36 There are twenty-five executive directors. Each of the five largest capital-
contributing states appoints an executive director. (The president of the United States appoints
the U.S. executive director with the advice and consent of the Senate.)37 The IBRD’s other
members elect the remaining twenty executive directors. Each of these executive directors rep-
resents a group of member states,38 and each casts the aggregate number of votes allocated to
the members that he or she represents.39 Among other things, the executive directors approve
every loan that the IBRD makes by majority of votes cast.
Unlike most other international organizations, the IBRD does not operate on a one-state,
one-vote basis. Instead, members’ votes are weighted by their capital contributions.40 The
United States has the most votes: today it casts just over 15 percent of the total votes41 —a thou-
sand times more votes than Palau, which casts the fewest.42 The United States has never had
a formal veto over run-of-the-mill decisions by the executive directors and Board of Governors,
but its voting share does allow it to veto amendments to the IBRD’s charter.43
The executive directors together select the Bank’s president, who is charged with conduct-
ing its ordinary business.44 As head of the Bank’s management and staff, the president plays
a key role in setting the bank’s direction. By tradition—but not by requirement in the
charter—the president has to date always been an American.45 The charter provides that
the president, like the rest of the Bank’s staff, is to be an international civil servant loyal only
to the bank.46 The Bank president can be dismissed only by a decision of the executive
directors.47
34 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215526322295/BankGovernors.pdf
(listing names and titles of IBRD and IDA governors).
35 IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. V, §2(a). The board can delegate nearly all of its powers to the executive
directors. Id., Art. V, §2(a), (b).
36 The Board of Governors meets too rarely and is “too large a body to do more than ratify proposals put to it
and serve as a general indicator of trends of thought.” EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD
BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS 63 (1973).
37 The Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 79-171, §3(a), 59 Stat. 512 (1945) [hereinafter BWAA].
38 IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. V, §4(b).
39 Id., §4(g).
40 Id., §3(a), (b).
41 World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Subscriptions and Voting Power of Member
Countries ( June 30, 2013), at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/
IBRDCountryVotingTable.pdf (noting that the United States casts 297,459 votes out of a total of 1,956,440 votes,
or 15.2 percent).
42 Id. (noting that Palau casts 594 votes out of a total of 1,956,440 votes, or 0.03 percent).
43 IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. VIII(a) (requiring approval of amendments by members having 85 per-
cent of total voting power).
44 Id., Art V, §5(a), (b); see also infra note 51.
45 See Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organization: The Operational Constitution
and Its Critics, 103 AJIL 209 (2009); Catherine Gwin, U.S. Relations with the World Bank, 1945–1992, in 2 THE
WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY 195, 246 (Devesh Kapur, John Prior Lewis & Richard Webb eds.,
1997) (“This prerogative was initially granted not only because the United States was the Bank’s largest shareholder
but also because it was the key guarantor and principal capital market for Bank bonds.”).
46 The Bank’s president, officers, and staff “owe their duty entirely to the Bank and to no other authority”; the
Bank’s members are obligated to “respect the international character of this duty” and to “refrain from all attempts
to influence any of them in the discharge of their duties.” IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. V, §5(c).
47 Id., §5(a).
2013] 523CONGRESS UNDERESTIMATED: THE CASE OF THE WORLD BANK
The International Development Association was established in 1960 to support economic
development in states that are too poor or insufficiently creditworthy to borrow from the
IBRD.48 The typical terms for IDA loans are highly concessional—that is, their terms are so
generous that in reality they are more grants than loans.49 Formally, the IDA is a separate
international organization from the IBRD. On the ground, however, the two institutions are
inextricable.50 The IDA shares the IBRD’s president, executive directors, governors, office
space, and staff.51 The IDA’s decision-making structure is nearly identical to that of the
IBRD.52 The concessional nature of the IDA’s loans produces the biggest difference between
the IBRD and the IDA: unlike the IBRD, the IDA requires regular infusions of new funds from
its member states, which typically agree to replenish the IDA’s coffers every three years. As
explained in part III below, this feature of the IDA significantly strengthens Congress’s hand
when it comes to shaping policy concerning both the IBRD and IDA.
II. LEGISLATING NEGOTIATION AND VOTING INSTRUCTIONS
Although Congress’s instructions for negotiation and voting began to proliferate during the
1970s, the first example of such an instruction dates back to 1945. These instructions are quite
possibly unconstitutional.53 And yet, no president before George H. W. Bush contested their
constitutionality. Without delving into the substance of the constitutional question, this sec-
tion seeks to explain why the executive branch failed to object on constitutional grounds during
the Bank’s first several decades.
48 MASON & ASHER, supra note 36, at 383.
49 IDA loans, or “credits,” typically carry no or low interest charges, have grace periods of five to ten years, and
are repaid over a period of twenty-five to forty years. The IDA also provides some outright grants. World Bank, What
Is IDA?, at http://go.worldbank.org/ZRAOR8IWW0.
50 MASON & ASHER, supra note 36, at 380–81 (“As an international organization affiliated with the World
Bank, IDA is an elaborate fiction. Called an ‘association,’ and possessed of Articles of Agreement, officers, govern-
mental members galore, and all the trappings of other international agencies, it is as yet simply a fund administered
by the World Bank.”); Ronald T. Libby, International Development Association: A Legal Fiction Designed to Secure
an LDC Constituency, 29 INT’L ORG. 1065 (1975).
51 Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, Art. VI, Jan. 26, 1960, 11 UST 2284, 439
UNTS 249; see also International Development Association Act, Pub. L. No. 86-565, §3, 74 Stat. 293 ( June 30, 1960).
52 Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, supra note 51, Art. VI, §3; World Bank
Group Finances: IDA Voting Power, at https://finances.worldbank.org/Shareholder-Equity/IDA-Voting-Power/
4g6v-z4mt.
53 Most of the literature on the Bank assumes that Congress has the authority to issue such instructions. Jonathan
Sanford, for example, observes without comment that “the President and Congress both have this power [to instruct
the executive director] and both are inclined to use it.” Jonathan Earl Sanford, U.S. Policy Toward the Multilateral
Development Banks: The Role of Congress, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1988) (emphasis added);
see also Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World
Bank Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241, 255–56 (2003) (“Also, Congress can dictate the votes of the director by statute
(subject to veto and overrides, of course).”). Thomas Franck and Edward Weisband observe that the “making . . .
of . . . country-by-country rules” regarding votes in the international financial institutions is “clearly more appro-
priate to the executive than the legislative branch,” but they do not directly assess the instructions’ constitutionality.
THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 93 (1979). Ian Bowles and Cyril
Kormos briefly consider and ultimately reject constitutional objections to legislated instructions. Ian A. Bowles &
Cyril F. Kormos, Environmental Reform at the World Bank: The Role of the U.S. Congress, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 777,
813–19 (1995). Kathryn Lavelle mentions the dispute over a signing statement issued by President Obama in 2009
but does not address other signing statements or debates over the scope of the president’s exclusive negotiation
authority. See LAVELLE, supra note 28, at 166.
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The Constitutional Question
The text of the Constitution does not explicitly allocate negotiation authority. The primary
constitutional sources for the president’s negotiation authority include the president’s
authority under Article II to “make treaties” and to “receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers.”54 These explicit grants of authority have been interpreted to confer on the president
substantive discretion regarding at least two important foreign affairs decisions: whether to rec-
ognize particular governments and whether to follow through and ratify international agree-
ments after obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the Senate.55
Whether the president retains comparable discretion with respect to other decisions or com-
munications on the international plane—such as how to vote on a particular Bank loan—re-
mains contested. The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, confirmed that the president
is “the constitutional representative of the United States in its dealings with foreign nations.”56
But these kinds of statements do not address whether the president has exclusive authority to
determine the substantive content that he will communicate.57 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has declined to enforce a statutory requirement that the executive branch nego-
tiate treaties to protect sea turtles, reasoning that it violated the separation of powers by infring-
ing on the president’s exclusive negotiation authority.58 But commentators remain divided.59
Presidents are usually quick to object to perceived incursions into their constitutional
authority: they have both the institutional capacity and the incentive to do so.60 The prominent
role of practice in resolving separation-of-powers disputes in the foreign affairs field supplies
54 U.S. CONST. Art. II, §§2, 3; see also David J. Barron, Office of Legal Counsel, Constitutionality of Section 7054
of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act 4–5 ( June 1, 2009), at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2009/
section7054.pdf.
55 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1007
(1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 479
(4th ed. 2011).
56 United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 319 (1936); Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 235 (1839).
57 See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984, at 208 (5th rev. ed.
1984) (“[W]hile the President alone may address foreign governments and be addressed by them, yet in fulfilling
these functions he is, or at least may be, the mouthpiece of a power of decision that resides elsewhere.”). Putting
this question in the framework that Justice Jackson sets out in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, the question is whether the president’s power is “preclusive” and allows him to “take[ ] measures incom-
patible with the expressed or implied will of Congress” regarding the positions that he or other members of the exec-
utive branch will stake out. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952); see also David
J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and
Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 691–98 (2008).
58 Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1993).
59 Compare LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE US CONSTITUTION 249 (2d ed. 1996) (“Attempts
by Congress to instruct U.S. representatives [to international organizations] are highly questionable as a matter of
constitutional separation of powers, and are usually only hortatory or are likely to be treated as such by the Pres-
ident.”), and H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 558–59 (arguing that the executive branch has the exclusive authority to determine the
time, scope, and objectives of all negotiations), with Lori Fisler Damrosch, Treaties and International Regulation,
98 ASIL PROC. 349, 351(2004) (describing the Justice Department’s position that statutes cannot direct the pres-
ident to vote a certain way in an international forum as “wrong as a matter of democratic political theory, historical
experience, common sense, and constitutional law”); see also Bowles & Kormos, supra note 53, at 813–19; Edward
Swaine, International Organizations (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (suggesting that the
constitutional analysis may depend on the type of instruction at issue).
60 Moe & Howell, supra note 5, at 145; Bradley & Morrison, supra note 8.
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one incentive.61 By acceding to legislated negotiation and voting instructions, the executive
builds support for the proposition that such instructions are, in fact, constitutional.62
For this reason, the absence of constitutional objections from the executive branch until the
late 1980s presents something of a puzzle. The best explanation is that implementing the nego-
tiation and voting instructions generally imposed low costs on the executive branch. Congress’s
instructions were frequently drafted in a way that allowed the executive branch to avoid trig-
gering them. When the instructions precluded wriggling out in this way, the Bank’s voting
rules limited the consequences of implementing Congress’s instructions. Although the United
States casts a disproportionate share of the votes at the Bank, its voting power has never been
large enough to determine singlehandedly whether individual loans are approved. As a result,
the U.S. executive director could follow Congress’s instructions to oppose a particular loan,
confident that it would still be approved by the other executive directors. This is not to suggest
that complying with Congress’s voting instructions is completely cost free, however: U.S. exec-
utive directors have remonstrated that when the U.S. vote is predetermined by legislation, the
United States loses influence and the ability to shape the terms of particular loans.63
The First Legislated Instructions
Congress’s first legislated instructions date back to the Bretton Woods Agreements Act
(BWAA), the 1945 legislation that authorized the United States’ participation in the IBRD
and the IMF. In the BWAA, Congress directed the U.S. representatives at the Bank to “obtain
promptly an official interpretation by the Bank as to its authority to make or guarantee loans
for programs of economic reconstruction and the reconstruction of monetary systems, includ-
ing long-term stabilization loans.”64 In the event that the efforts to secure this interpretation
failed, Congress directed the U.S. representatives to propose, support, and accept an amend-
ment to that effect.65 The BWAA also included complementary instructions to the IMF gov-
ernor and executive director to obtain an official interpretation confirming that the IMF lacks
comparable authority.66
61 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Mortenson, supra note 9, at 377–78; see
also Peter Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1338, 1355 (1993) (describing how
war powers law is developed by “an accretion of interactions among the branches, that gives rise to basic norms gov-
erning the branches’ behavior in the area”).
62 Cf. Barron & Lederman, supra note 57, at 697 (arguing that Congress has enacted restrictions on the conduct
of military campaigns “too often, and Presidents challenged their legality too infrequently . . . , for anything like
a tradition of preclusive power to have taken root”); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1101 (2008) (arguing that this history
of congressional regulation coupled with executive acquiescence also “casts doubt on the functionalist contention
that a President cannot possibly conduct a war so long as he understands himself to be subject to legislatively
imposed restrictions”).
63 Robert B. Holland III, Op-Ed., The Real World Bank Scandal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2007, at A15 (former
U.S. executive director describing legislatively mandated voting requirements as “mind-numbing and influence
diminishing”); telephone interview with Jan Piercy, former U.S. Executive Director of the World Bank (May 7,
2012) (explaining that other executive directors have little reason to accept modifications to loan terms proposed
by the United States when there is no chance that accepting the U.S. proposal would shift the U.S. vote).
64 BWAA, supra note 37, §12.
65 Id.
66 Id., §13.
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The BWAA’s legislative history and the broader context of its enactment suggest two inter-
related reasons why the executive branch declined to object to this initial set of voting instruc-
tions. The executive branch placed a high priority on Congress’s accepting the Bretton Woods
agreements without reservations or amendments because it did not want to reopen interna-
tional negotiations.67 The rest of the world was watching: Congress was considering these
agreements before any other state that had participated in the negotiations at Bretton Woods.
The United States’ rejection of the League of Nations still loomed large.
And yet, key members of Congress initially refused to accept the Bretton Woods agreements
as drafted, largely due to concerns about the IMF.68 They took seriously the arguments made
by opponents, including the American Banking Association, whose members feared that
extensive borrowing from the IMF to address major, long-term economic challenges would
deplete the IMF’s funds.69 They wanted to amend the IMF agreement to make sure that any
such loans would be made by the IBRD rather than the IMF.70 The Treasury Department indi-
cated its willingness to support long-term loans only at the IBRD but opposed amending either
agreement. The IMF’s opponents, however, were not content to rely exclusively on the Trea-
sury Department’s assurances.71
This left the Bretton Woods supporters with a challenge: how to provide Congress with a
stronger commitment to comply with its views on permissible uses of the IMF without amend-
ing the IMF or IBRD agreement. The legislated instructions supplied a mutually acceptable
solution. They required the Treasury Department to confirm—officially—the interpretations
that would placate the IMF’s opponents.72 Meanwhile, the executive branch was able to secure
approval for the IMF and IBRD agreements without amendment or reservation. Had the exec-
utive branch raised constitutional objections to such instructions, this particular solution
would not have been possible.
The administration’s eagerness to establish congressional-executive agreements as a consti-
tutionally permissible method to approve international agreements suggests an additional rea-
son why the executive branch declined to invoke constitutional arguments to fend off legislated
instructions. The administration sought approval of the Bretton Woods agreements from a
majority of both houses of Congress rather than two-thirds of the Senate (as Article II of the
Constitution requires), and worked hard to make the case that this option was constitutional.
During the early and mid-1940s, the extent to which the two-house procedure could substitute
for approval by two-thirds of the Senate was hotly contested.73 State and Treasury Department
officials argued that legislation was a particularly appropriate mechanism for authorizing U.S.
67 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2211 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 79th Cong. 253 (1945) [here-
inafter Hearings on H.R. 2211] (statement of Dean Acheson, assistant secretary of state).
68 See, e.g., RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 129–43 (1969); LAVELLE, supra note
28, at 39–61.
69 See Hearings on H.R. 2211, supra note 67, at 734–35 (statement of Ralph Flanders, president of the Federal
Reserve Bank, Boston, and chairman, Research Committee, Committee for Economic Development); LAVELLE,
supra note 28, at 46–61.
70 Hearings on H.R. 2211, supra note 67, at 735.
71 Id. at 743.
72 W. Randolph Burgess, president of the American Bankers Association, praised the amended bill and noted that
it included several of the ABA’s recommendations. Burgess Praises Bretton Changes, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1945, at
21.
73 See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 861–96 (1995).
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participation in the Bank and the IMF in light of the overlap between the subject matter of the
Bretton Woods agreements and Congress’s authority under Article I, Section 8, of the Con-
stitution.74 The State and Treasury Departments also cited the large volume of existing
legislation related to the subject matter of the Bretton Woods agreements, noting that “there
are few examples of an international agreement which affect so intimately the powers of Con-
gress in such important fields or which so directly affect such a complex pattern of legislation
already enacted and congressional policy already enunciated.”75 It would have been awkward
for the executive branch to object to negotiation instructions on constitutional grounds while
at the same time it was, in defending the constitutionality of congressional-executive agree-
ments, emphasizing the appropriateness of congressional involvement.
In any event, the U.S. executive director followed the negotiation instructions contained in
the BWAA and, at the inaugural meeting of the Bank’s member states, requested Congress’s
preferred interpretation of the Bank’s authority. Treasury Department officials had told mem-
bers of Congress that they did not expect it to be a tough sell.76 And, indeed, the Treasury
Department was able to deliver: the Bank’s executive directors adopted the United States’ pro-
posal.77 Not long thereafter, the IMF adopted the complementary interpretation that Con-
gress had instructed the Treasury Department to pursue.78
Legislated Instructions Become Commonplace
After a quarter-century gap, Congress started legislating instructions with increasing regu-
larity.79 In 1972, at the behest of Representative Henry Gonzales, Congress enacted the first
set of voting instructions to the U.S. executive director.80 The instructions required the U.S.
executive director to oppose loans to countries that had expropriated U.S. property, unless the
president determined that adequate compensation was being negotiated or had been paid. 81
These instructions appeared not to faze the executive branch. One reason is that the instruc-
tions coincided with preexisting executive branch policy.82 They also tracked the Bank’s pre-
existing policy (adopted under pressure from the United States) against lending to countries
that expropriated foreign property without compensation.83 What is more, the legislated
instructions left the executive branch with considerable discretion in deciding whether a waiver
74 Bretton Woods Agreements Act: Hearings on H.R. 3314 Before the S.Comm. on Banking & Currency, 79th Cong.
533 (1945) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 3314].
75 Id. at 537.
76 Id. at 224.
77 NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, REPORT
ON PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FUND AND BANK TO OCTOBER 31, 1946, H.R. Doc. No.
80-53, at 8 (1947) (submitted by the president to Congress on January 13, 1947).
78 Id. at 9.
79 See infra notes 194–96 (discussing reasons for this gap).
80 118 CONG. REC. 2045 (1972).
81 An Act to Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the International Development Asso-
ciation, Pub. L. No. 92-247, 86 Stat. 60 (1972) (codified at 22 U.S.C. 284(k)).
82 H.R. REP. NO. 92-772, at 8 (1972); see also STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OF THE
COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., U.S. POLICY AND MULTILATERAL BANKS: POLITICIZATION
AND EFFECTIVENESS 9 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter 1977 STAFF REPORT].
83 See Lars Schoultz, Politics, Economics, and U.S. Participation in Multilateral Development Banks, 36 INT’L
ORG. 537, 556 (1982); MASON & ASHER, supra note 36, at 747.
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was appropriate because “adequate” compensation had been paid or because negotiations were
under way.84
Also in 1972, Congress added instructions regarding the drug trade by means of a floor
amendment introduced by Representative Charles Rangel. These instructions required the
U.S. executive director to oppose loans to any country that the president determined had taken
inadequate steps to prohibit the legal sale of narcotic drugs and other controlled substances to
U.S. nationals in its territory.85 As drafted, the instructions were triggered only if the president
made an explicit finding. But since the president never actually made such a finding, the
instructions were never triggered.86
Two years later, in 1974, Congress adopted new voting instructions introduced by Repre-
sentative Clarence Long. These instructions mandated opposition to IDA loans to countries
that failed to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty after developing a nuclear device.87
(Because the voting instructions were added on the floor after the relevant bill made its way out
of the committee, the administration did not publicly take a position on the amendment.) The
instructions were targeted specifically at India, which had successfully tested a nuclear weapon
the preceding May.
Unlike earlier voting instructions, these were drafted in a way that did not leave the executive
branch much room for discretion:
The United States Governor is authorized and directed to vote against any loan or other
utilization of the funds of the Association for the benefit of any country which develops
any nuclear explosive device, unless the country is or becomes a State Party to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.88
Indeed, before these instructions were repealed in 1977, the United States cast twenty-six “no”
votes against IDA loans to India.89
Even these detailed voting instructions provoked no constitutional opposition from the
executive branch. In addition, their effect was limited because the instructions did not mean-
ingfully affect the U.S. position through informal channels—the ones that mattered if the U.S.
vote was to have any chance of affecting Bank policy. The administration never tried very hard
to persuade other governments to emulate its vote or to dissuade bank management from pro-
posing the kinds of loans in question.90 Notwithstanding the negative U.S. vote, the Bank’s
executive directors approved every one of the proposed IDA loans to India. Representative
Long had anticipated the symbolic nature of the instructions. In introducing them, he
explained:
84 As foreign affairs scholars have noted, by drafting statutory text with vague terms, Congress delegates signif-
icant authority to the executive branch to interpret it. See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 6.
85 An Act to Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the International Development Asso-
ciation, Pub. L. No. 92-247, 86 Stat. 60 (1972).
86 1977 STAFF REPORT, supra note 82, at 10.
87 An Act to Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the International Development Asso-
ciation, Pub. L. No. 93-373, §3, 88 Stat. 445 (1974).
88 Id.
89 Schoultz, supra note 83, at 558. The executive branch could have argued that it is the executive director, not
the governor, who votes on loans—but it chose not to invoke this technicality as a reason for disregarding the leg-
islation.
90 1977 STAFF REPORT, supra note 82, at 8.
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All my amendment does is put America on record against nuclear proliferation.
. . . .
In adopting this amendment, we are not binding the IDA, only our own Governor.
That is all. As of January 1974, the United States has 25 percent of the vote. Fifty-one per-
cent of the votes cast are required to reject an IDA loan.
Thus, my amendment could not by itself cut off IDA loans to any country.91
The Ford administration was the first to resist legislated voting instructions, but it objected
on policy—not constitutional—grounds. In 1976, then Representative Tom Harkin intro-
duced legislation targeting two of the regional development banks—the African Development
Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank. Harkin’s instructions required the U.S.
executive directors of those institutions to oppose loans to any government that violated its cit-
izens’ human rights unless the loan proceeds would directly benefit needy people.92 Starting
in 1973, Congress had started taking steps to reduce or eliminate U.S. foreign assistance to
countries that were engaging in significant human rights violations.93 Members of Congress
were outraged to discover that at the same time that U.S. aid to human rights violators like
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand
was declining, multilateral aid to these same states was more than making up the difference.94
Harkin’s instructions sought to align the U.S. policy on multilateral and bilateral aid, and to
limit the executive branch’s ability to circumvent Congress’s preferences by turning to mul-
tilateral institutions to distribute resources.
Assistant Secretary of State William Rogers testified that the administration firmly opposed
the Harkin Amendment. Introducing a non-economic issue into the regional development
banks “smacks of paternalism,” he argued, and “would make it more difficult for the U.S. gov-
ernment to oppose the introduction of other noneconomic preferences by other countries to
these institutions.”95 Rogers’s explanation alluded to a provision in the IBRD’s charter that
prohibits the bank and its officers from interfering in the political affairs of the bank’s member
states and provides that only “economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions.”96
The meaning of this prohibition has been contested over the IBRD’s history; the views of
both member states and the bank’s own staff as to what counts as “economic” versus “political”
(and whether these two categories can even be distinguished) have shifted over time.97
91 120 CONG. REC. 22,030 (1974).
92 An Act to Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the Inter-American Development Bank,
Pub. L. No. 94-302, §§103, 211, 90 Stat. 591 (1976).
93 FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 53, at 85; Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on
Human Rights Practices, 76 AJIL 246 (1982).
94 LARS SCHOULTZ, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 282–83
(1981); FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 53, at 92.
95 IDB and AFDF Authorization: Hearing on H.R. 9721 Before the S. Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1976).
96 IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. IV, §10; see also Articles of Agreement of the International Development
Association, supra note 51, Art. V, §6 (same).
97 See, e.g., IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 65–79 (1991); CATHERINE
WEAVER, THE HYPOCRISY TRAP (2008) (describing how good governance and corruption came to be understood
as appropriate topics for the Bank to address); Galit Sarfaty, Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The
Marginality of Human Rights at the World Bank, 103 AJIL 647, 658–65 (2009) (describing fierce contests and evo-
lution in perspectives about whether the Bank’s Articles of Agreement permit the Bank to directly address human
rights).
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Notwithstanding the State Department’s objections, the Harkin Amendment was adopted
without opposition.98 In the remaining months of the Ford administration, the United States
cast one vote against a loan to Chile on account of the legislation.99
The following year, in 1977, the Carter administration repeated the Ford administration’s
objections when Harkin introduced legislation that would extend the human rights language
to the IBRD and the IDA. The Carter administration opposed mandatory voting instructions
even though President Carter considered human rights a centerpiece of his foreign policy.100
Hoping to placate Congress, the Carter administration suggested it would accept a milder
requirement that the United States, “in connection with its voice and vote . . . , shall advance
the cause of human rights, including by seeking to channel assistance toward countries other
than those whose governments engage in a consistent pattern of gross violation of internation-
ally recognized human rights.”101 But the administration’s proposed language was rejected. In
its place, a coalition of committed human rights supporters and conservative opponents of the
development banks successfully enacted legislation that mandated opposition to all loans to
countries that engaged in “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights” unless the project supported by the loan would “serve the basic human needs
of the citizens of such country.”102
Notwithstanding its objections, the Carter administration implemented these instruc-
tions.103 By 1980, the U.S. executive director at the World Bank had voted against, or
abstained on, 112 loan proposals for human rights reasons.104 And yet, every single one of these
loans was approved by the relevant multilateral development bank.105
These statistics actually understate the influence of Congress’s legislation. The United
States’ predetermined negative vote affected the kinds of loans that the Bank management
brought to the executive directors for approval. In 1977, for example, borrowing states with-
drew at least a half dozen loan requests once they became aware of the legislation that mandated
U.S. opposition.106 In addition, the multilateral development banks restricted their processing
of loan proposals from repressive governments that did not serve the basic human needs of their
citizens. As a consequence, some loan proposals that would have received a negative U.S. vote
were never proposed to the executive directors for approval.107 Thus, notwithstanding
98 An Act to Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the Inter-American Development Bank,
supra note 92, §§103, 211.
99 Schoultz, supra note 83, at 559.
100 Gwin, supra note 45, at 225.
101 International Development Institutions Authorizations, 1977: Hearings on H.R. 5262 Before the Subcomm. on
Int’l Dev. Inst. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 9, 48 (1977).
102 An Act to Provide for Increased Participation by the United States in the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, the International Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the
Asian Development Bank and the Asian Development Fund, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 95-118,
§701(a)(1), (f), 91 Stat. 1067 (1977). The language closely tracks a prohibition on bilateral military assistance to
human rights violators adopted in 1973. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
103 See SCHOULTZ, supra note 94, at 292–300.
104 Schoultz, supra note 83, at 564.
105 Id. at 565.
106 SCHOULTZ, supra note 94, at 295.
107 Id. at 295–98.
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objections that legislated instructions diminish the United States’ influence, at least in some
cases Congress’s instructions can amplify it.108
Voting instructions were not the only tool on which Congress relied; it also passed legislation
that directed U.S. representatives to pursue specified policies109—as in 1978, when Congress
used this tactic to supplement its human rights voting instructions. In that instance, Congress
directed the president to direct the U.S. governor of the IBRD and other multilateral devel-
opment banks to seek an amendment to the banks’ charters that would explicitly require the
banks to consider human rights in its lending decisions.110
The executive branch complied with Congress’s instructions, but the vigor with which it
pursued the amendment Congress desired is difficult to verify. A year later, Treasury Secretary
W. Michael Blumenthal reported: “ ‘We got a unanimous reaction that such an amendment
if proposed would not be adopted and that it would be argued to be contrary to certain fun-
damental principles in the banks.’ Those principles were that ‘the banks are to pursue economic
criteria and not to stray afield from that.’”111 Without being able to independently corroborate
the positions taken by foreign governments, members of Congress had little choice but to
accept the executive branch’s characterizations.112
These examples illustrate the practical obstacles that Congress faces in its efforts to shape
Bank policy—even when the executive branch refrains from raising constitutional objections
to Congress’s efforts. By the end of the 1970s, the practice of putting mandatory voting and
negotiation instructions into legislation was well established. The executive branch consis-
tently implemented the letter of the instructions. But when the executive branch did not share
the underlying policy goal, those instructions failed to galvanize it to advocate vigorously for
Congress’s policy preferences at the Bank. Controlling the vote of the U.S. executive director
gives Congress only limited influence over the Bank. Because the Bank’s executive directors
make decisions by majority vote, and the U.S. share of the total votes has never exceeded that
threshold, the impact of determining the U.S. vote has always been limited.
The lesson of the 1970s is that meaningfully influencing Bank policy is not as simple as
enacting a slew of negotiation instructions—even if those instructions are framed in manda-
tory terms that the executive branch implements without raising constitutional objections.113
108 Robert Putnam has argued that domestic constraints can enhance a state’s international bargaining position
when, for example, that state’s legislature must ratify the negotiated agreement before it can enter into force. Robert
D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988). Congress’s
ex ante voting instructions do not track this two-step model. They come closest when the U.S. executive director
can credibly argue that, unless the other executive directors agree to a particular decision, Congress might withhold
the next round of funding for the Bank.
109 See 1977 STAFF REPORT, supra note 82, at 11–16 (describing other examples of such instructions).
110 An Act Making Appropriations for Foreign Assistance and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending Sep-
tember 30, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-481, §611, 92 Stat. 1591 (1978).
111 Quoted in BABB, supra note 32, at 185.
112 See subsection “Monitoring the Executive Branch” in part V, below.
113 Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney do not take this point into account when they model the relationship
between the Bank and its member states in principal-agent terms. See Nielson & Tierney, supra note 53. Nielson
and Tierney acknowledge Congress’s importance by modeling it as a separate and independent principal of the
Bank. But Congress is not a proximate principal of the Bank. Congress must work through the executive branch
to influence the Bank, and as this article explains, the executive branch has many tools available to neutralize Con-
gress’s efforts to shape Bank policy. Because Nielson and Tierney focus on environmental reform at the Bank—
where Congress enjoyed remarkable success in motivating the executive branch (and ultimately in influencing the
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Congress needs to persuade the U.S. executive director to engage effectively with both other
member states and with the Bank’s management.114 But as Congress learned when it directed
advocacy of a human rights amendment, it was difficult to ensure a vigorous campaign through
legislation alone. Congress’s influence at the Bank would thus remain limited unless Congress
found some other way to motivate the executive branch.
III. DEPLOYING THE POWER OF THE PURSE
Commentators have long acknowledged that Congress’s ability to cut off funding may well
be its most important tool in shaping foreign policy—although it is hardly an all-powerful one
and can be tricky to deploy effectively.115 The first of the three subsections below describes
how, after a false start, Congress used its appropriations authority to galvanize the executive
branch not merely to implement the letter of voting instructions but to actively engage the
Bank’s management to address Congress’s concerns regarding loans to Vietnam. The second
subsection describes how, during the second half of the 1980s, Congress transformed the Rea-
gan administration into an effective advocate for environmental concerns at the Bank. These
examples belie the conventional account of a diminished and quiescent Congress that leaves
to the executive branch the responsibility and authority to manage the United States’ ongoing
interactions with international organizations.116 The third subsection below discusses limits
on the potential use of threats to cut funding.
At the outset it is worth noting exactly how Congress, as a collective body, accomplished its
goals regarding the Bank. Although Congress does appropriate funds by passing legislation,
deploying the power of the purse does not require action by Congress as a whole—or, to be
more specific, does not depend on securing the agreement of majorities in both the House and
Senate, in addition to the president’s signature. Provided that he or she chairs the right com-
mittee or subcommittee, a single member of the House or Senate can—and frequently does—
credibly threaten to withhold funding. This option significantly lowers the cost of congressio-
nal action, at least for those members of Congress who hold certain leadership positions.117 To
withhold funds, they do not need to solve collective action problems or prevail at the veto
points that can prevent a bill from becoming a law.118
Bank), see infra part III—they do not consider the possibility that the executive branch might resist Congress’s
efforts.
114 Gwin, supra note 45, at 244–45, 263; BABB, supra note 32.
115 See, e.g., KOH, supra note 5, at 128–31 (describing appropriations limitations as an imperfect tool with many
defects that nevertheless “remains one of Congress’s few effective legal tools to regulate presidential initiatives in
foreign affairs”); Moe & Howell, supra note 5, at 147–48 (describing Congress’s constitutional power to appro-
priate money as a “very real” but not “crippling constraint” on presidents).
116 They also illustrate how Congress can shrink the universe of actions that the president might take unilaterally.
See Moe & Howell, supra note 5.
117 Compare sources cited supra note 9 (describing collective action problems and high transaction costs of con-
gressional action).
118 Cf. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 8, at 446 (noting that Congress can more easily push back against the
executive branch by using “soft law” tools that are not subject to the collective action problems that beset the formal
legislative process); see also Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (2012) (describing soft
law tools in greater detail). Chafetz notes that withholding money is easier than appropriating it because either the
House or Senate, acting alone, can withhold money. Id. at 725. As this part explains, however, the point goes even
further: some individual members of Congress can credibly threaten to withhold money.
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The legislative vehicles for Congress’s negotiation and voting instructions evolved over time.
Starting in the 1980s, Congress’s instructions were much more likely to be “riders”—substan-
tive provisions attached to appropriations bills.119 The dynamics surrounding appropriations
legislation—especially the omnibus appropriations bills that simultaneously fund many parts
of the federal government—differ from other legislation. Appropriations bills must pass to
avoid shutting down the federal government, which means that individual legislators face con-
siderable pressure to support them and that the president faces considerable pressure to sign
them into law.120 These dynamics make appropriations bills attractive vehicles for substantive
provisions that may lack majority support in freestanding bills. The policy merits of individual
riders are less likely to have been evaluated during hearings by committees with subject-matter
expertise.121 Decisions about which riders will be included in a particular appropriations bill
are made by a handful of key congressional players in leadership roles; the process is not trans-
parent.122 Finally, legislators frequently have little knowledge of the substantive provisions
buried in appropriations bills that often run hundreds or, in the case of omnibus appropriations
bills, thousands of pages long.123
The frequent use of these mechanisms—appropriations riders and threats to withhold fund-
ing—for formulating Bank policy is one reason why congressional action does not guarantee
democratic accountability. Congressional action regarding the Bank is not necessarily the
product of public debate that results in agreement among a broad cross-section of represen-
tatives.124 Whatever it means for democratic accountability, however, there is no doubt that
by coupling its instructions with funding cuts, Congress can motivate the executive branch to
embrace its policies and also capture the attention of the Bank’s management and other exec-
utive directors. Because the United States supplies a disproportionately large share of the
Bank’s resources, the Bank would keenly feel any cuts. The desire to avoid such cuts may cause
both the Bank’s management and other executive directors to be particularly attentive to Con-
gress’s demands. In this way Congress’s participation in the policymaking process can actually
amplify the United States’ influence when the executive branch shares Congress’s policy goals.125
Attemps to Restrict U.S. Funds for Bank Loans to Vietnam
In 1977, frustrated by the limited symbolic accomplishments of previously enacted voting
instructions, Representative C. W. Bill Young of Texas opted for a different tactic. He pro-
posed legislation that would earmark appropriations to both the Bank and the regional devel-
opment banks. That is, he sought to prohibit U.S. funds from being used for bank loans to
119 Although internal House and Senate rules prohibit substantive provisions in appropriations legislation, these
rules are often waived. Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environ-
mental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 636–37 (2006).
120 In contrast, failure to pass a new authorization statute preserves the status quo. Id. at 634; see also GLEN S.
KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE: OMNIBUS LEGISLATING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 2 (2001)
121 KRUTZ, supra note 120, at 3–4.
122 Id. at 4, 32–35.
123 Id. at 2.
124 This discussion brackets the questions raised earlier about whether congressional action is necessary for inter-
national organizations to be democratically accountable.
125 See supra note 108. The Reagan administration actively and repeatedly sought reduced funding from Con-
gress for other international organizations—most notably, the United Nations—precisely to enhance the United
States’ leverage. José E. Alvarez, Legal Remedies and the United Nations’ à la Carte Problem, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L.
229 (1991).
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Cambodia, Laos, Uganda, and Vietnam.126 Both the Senate and the Carter administration
opposed these provisions, arguing that the multilateral development banks could not accept
restricted funds.127 These arguments were credible because the Inter-American Development
Bank had recently rejected a U.S. appropriation that included an earmark requiring that $50
million of the $350 million appropriation be used to promote cooperatives, credit unions, and
saving-and-loan associations.128 The Inter-American bank’s president, Antonio Ortiz Mena,
explained that accepting the funds would “flow both against the letter and the spirit of the
[Inter-American] Bank’s charter.”129 Likewise, World Bank President Robert McNamara
argued that accepting restricted funds would violate the World Bank’s charter.130
The Carter administration initially was able to head off the conflict by promising to oppose
loans to the four countries that Young identified.131 Notwithstanding the negative U.S. vote,
the following year the Bank’s executive directors approved a $60 million IDA loan to Vietnam
for agricultural development.132 Young responded by introducing a narrower version of his
previous amendment, this time restricting only IDA funds to Vietnam, arguing that the Bank’s
loans to Vietnam freed up funds for that government to pursue war with its neighbors.133 This
revised amendment was accepted by the House and rejected by the Senate, and led to an acri-
monious and emotionally charged conference negotiation.134 The argument that the restric-
tion violated the IDA charter was certainly not dispositive in Congress; Senator Jake Garn of
Utah, for example, urged his colleagues to “forget about these legal niceties. Even if we’re
wrong, let’s do it anyway. Let’s stop the killing.”135
Before the conference negotiations concluded, McNamara took several unprecedented steps
to break the deadlock. Notwithstanding the requirement in the Bank’s charter that the Bank
interact with its member states only through their fiscal agencies,136 McNamara sat down with
a dozen members of Congress to explain that the restriction was not necessary because the Bank
had imposed a lending freeze on Vietnam.137 When this approach did not satisfy Young and
his supporters, U.S. Treasury officials did something unusual: they worked with the U.S.
executive director to draft a letter from McNamara to Clarence Long, chairman of the
126 Schoultz, supra note 83, at 567.
127 BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WORLD BANK 175
(1992).
128 An Act Making Appropriations for Foreign Assistance and Related Programs, Title III, Pub. L. No. 94-11,
89 Stat. 17, 23 (1975).
129 H. COMM. ON BANKING, CURRENCY & HOUSING, INCREASED U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, H.R. Rep. No. 94-541, at 17 (1975) (reprinting text of letter from Ortiz Mena
to Treasury Secretary William E. Simon).
130 See Letter from Robert S. McNamara, World Bank President, to W. Michael Blumenthal, Treasury Secretary
( July 5, 1977), reprinted in Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1979: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong. 535–36 (1978).
131 Schoultz, supra note 83, at 567.
132 Sanford, supra note 53, at 50.
133 See LAVELLE, supra note 28, at 100; Schoultz, supra note 83, at 568–69.
134 See John Felton, Freeze on Vietnam Loans Ends Effort to Restrict U.S. Funds for World Bank, CONG. Q., Nov.
3, 1979, at 2504 (describing conferees as “argu[ing] heatedly among themselves about who was more opposed to
Vietnam, and who disliked McNamara the most”).
135 Id.
136 IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. III, §2.
137 BROWN, supra note 127, at 187; Schoultz, supra note 83, at 570.
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Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.138 The letter explained that “events over the past year
have raised a very serious question about Vietnam’s current commitment to a rational devel-
opment policy. These questions were considered sufficiently fundamental to warrant a suspen-
sion of new lending to Vietnam.”139 Once the letter was signed and delivered, the House-Sen-
ate conference committee agreed to recommend eliminating all restrictions on U.S.
contributions to the Bank.140
The episode reveals just how powerful threats to suspend funding can be in motivating the
executive branch—and the Bank—to satisfy Congress. In the end, McNamara promised even
more than Representative Young could have achieved through his proposed restriction: at least
for a time, the Bank would make no new loans to Vietnam using funds from any source.
Whether the Bank would have made any new loans to Vietnam without Young’s intervention
is unclear: by one report, the Bank’s other executive directors had already soured on lend-
ing additional funds to Vietnam.141 Nevertheless, the Bank’s other executive directors exco-
riated McNamara for giving in to congressional demands. They accused him of violating
the charter provisions governing interactions with member states and of politicizing the Bank
(which, according to its charter, was to make decisions solely on the basis of economic con-
siderations).142
Making the Bank Environmentally Friendlier
Congress’s feat during the second half of the 1980s was even more impressive: it succeeded
in making the Reagan administration—whose attitude toward domestic environmental reg-
ulations was largely hostile—into a powerful advocate for environmental concerns at the Bank.
Congress accomplished this goal by coupling specific negotiation instructions with credible
threats to cut funding. Without those threats, Congress’s legislated instructions would likely
have failed to achieve more than symbolic victories.
Congress’s efforts to reform the Bank’s environmental track record were motivated by a sus-
tained and effective campaign by a group of politically savvy nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). In early 1983, advocates from environmental groups operating in Washington, DC,
began to organize a campaign to reform the Bank.143 They targeted the Bank not because it was
the worst environmental actor among the multilateral development banks but because it was
the best known and therefore most politically salient.144
One strategy for these NGOs was to approach the executive branch and urge it to embrace
their cause. (If Congress were truly sidelined, that would have been their only option.) Before
and since that particular time, individuals and interest groups have done so in an effort to influ-
ence U.S. policy toward the Bank. Recently, for example, representatives of private companies
138 Felton, supra note 134, at 3.
139 See 125 Cong. Rec. 34,414–15 (1979) (at Representative Young’s request, reprinting newspaper article that
quotes the text of the letter).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 William Clark, Robert McNamara at the World Bank, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1981, at 167.
143 See Robert Wade, Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment, 1970–1995, in 2 THE WORLD
BANK, supra note 45, at 611, 658; MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS
129 (1998).
144 Wade, supra note 143, at 658–59.
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lobbied the executive branch to oppose loans to Argentina in order to pressure it to pay inter-
national arbitration claims.145 But the NGOs rejected that option because of the Reagan
administration’s antagonism to both the environmental movement and multilateral develop-
ment banks.146 President Ronald Reagan came into office pressing a forceful deregulatory
agenda that sought to roll back domestic environmental laws.147 The first-term Reagan admin-
istration also had no particular enthusiasm for the Bank. It negotiated lower overall levels of
financial support for the Bank, with the intention that the private sector would step in as
needed to provide loans to governments for large-scale development projects.148 The admin-
istration also regularly opposed Bank loans for projects that, in its view, could be financed pri-
vately.149
And so, instead of approaching the executive branch, advocates trained their attention on
Congress. In 1983, as a first step, they persuaded a House subcommittee dealing with inter-
national development issues to hold two days of hearings about the Bank.150 On the first day,
representatives of U.S. environmental groups described myriad ways in which the Bank was
poorly equipped to evaluate and address the adverse environmental consequences of the proj-
ects supported by its loans.151 The following day’s testimony focused on the ways in which
Bank-supported projects had harmed indigenous populations.152 As the hearing ended, the
subcommittee chairman pronounced it both “thought provoking” and “somewhat disturb-
ing”—assessments that were shared by other members of the subcommittee—and promised
further action.153
Two years later, in 1985, Congress adopted the first batch of legislated instructions targeting
environmental aspects of lending by both the Bank and its regional counterparts. Most of these
instructions required the secretary of the treasury to instruct the U.S. executive directors of the
Bank and other multilateral development banks to secure commitments from the banks to
“add or strengthen professionally trained staff to undertake environmental review of projects”
and to “increase the proportion of their lending programs supporting environmentally ben-
eficial projects.”154 The legislation also included instructions that micromanaged the negoti-
ation process: they included, for example, a requirement that the U.S. executive directors
call for, by May 31, 1986, separate and special meetings of each of the Boards of Executive
Directors of these institutions to discuss their environmental performance, and ways in
which this performance can be improved, including alternative projects considered and
145 Come and Get Me: Argentina Is Putting International Arbitration to the Test, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, at
38.
146 Wade, supra note 143, at 667.
147 Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States Environmental Law, 20 VA.
ENVTL L.J. 75, 85–87 (2001).
148 BABB, supra note 32; id. at 110–14.
149 Id. at 117–20.
150 BRUCE RICH, MORTGAGING THE EARTH 113 (1994); Environmental Impact of Multilateral Development
Bank–Funded Projects: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Dev. Inst. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin.,
& Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. (1983).
151 Environmental Impact of Multilateral Development Bank–Funded Projects, supra note 150, at 1–119.
152 Id. at 489–535.
153 Id. at 522, 528, 535.
154 Joint Resolution Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-190,
§540(a)(1)–(4), 99 Stat. 1185, 1309–10 (1985).
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alternative configurations of projects with specific attention to environmental problems
associated with the following categories of projects: large impoundments of rivers in trop-
ical countries; penetration roads into relatively undeveloped areas;[and] agriculture and
rural development projects[.]155
The next year’s appropriation bill included more of the same,156 as did that of the follow-
ing year.157
If the Reagan administration had wanted to neutralize the force of these instructions, it had
at least two options available. The more confrontational option was to object to the instruc-
tions on constitutional grounds and decline to implement them. Another option was to com-
ply, but only nominally, with Congress’s instructions. For example, the U.S. executive director
could have unenthusiastically delivered the requisite talking points to his or her Bank col-
leagues, confident that they would understand that the United States was not actually pushing
hard on these issues.
The Reagan administration did neither.158 Instead, the Treasury Department became a vig-
orous advocate for environmental reform at the Bank.159 The turnaround in the Treasury
Department’s approach was dramatic. Bruce Rich, a leader of the NGO campaign, wrote that
the director of the Treasury Department’s Office of Multilateral Development Banks had
begun to sound like a “radical street agitator[ ]” when talking about the Bank.160
The Reagan administration’s own interests ultimately explain why it was willing not only
to accept Congress’s instructions on environmental reform but also to embrace its underlying
policy goals. During President Reagan’s second term, James Baker led the Treasury Depart-
ment. His top priority was to increase the Bank’s levels of structural-adjustment lending. Struc-
tural-adjustment loans are fast-disbursing loans that are conditioned on the borrowing state’s
implementation of specified macroeconomic policy changes.161 Baker viewed them as the solu-
tion to an increasingly urgent economic crisis, one touched off during the first term—in
August 1982—by Mexico’s announcement that it was suspending payment on its interna-
tional debt.162 The Treasury Department initially defined the problem as one of short-term
liquidity and turned to the IMF, rather than the Bank, to resolve it. These efforts failed. Fur-
ther action became more urgent as the ongoing economic crisis in Latin America and other
155 Id., §540(a)(6), 99 Stat. at 310.
156 Joint Resolution Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591,
§539, 100 Stat. 3341, 3341-232 to 3341-236 (1986).
157 Joint Resolution Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202,
§537(a), 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-161 to 1329-64 (1987).
158 No signing statements accompanied the signing of Pub L. No. 99-190, 99 Stat. 1185 (1985) (containing pro-
visions described supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text); Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341 (1986) (con-
taining provisions described supra note 156 and accompanying text); Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987)
(containing provisions described supra note 157 and accompanying text).
159 See generally Wade, supra note 143, at 665–72; BABB, supra note 32, at 187–91.
160 RICH, supra note 150, at 145 (1994).
161 Foreign Assistance and Related Programs: Appropriations for 1987: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm.
on Appropriations, 99th Cong. 595 (1986) (prepared statement of Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III identifying
“the privatization of burdensome and inefficient public enterprises,” “growth oriented tax reform,” “improvement
of the environment for both domestic and foreign direct investment,” and “trade liberalization and the rational-
ization of import regimes” as desired policy changes).
162 Gwin, supra note 45, at 232.
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developing countries reduced demand for U.S. exports and as U.S. banks fretted about their
heavy exposure to the risk of default.163
In a speech at the joint Bank-IMF annual meeting in October 1985—two months before
Congress adopted its first batch of legislated instructions regarding environmental issues—
Baker unveiled a new set of proposals, which became known as the Baker Plan.164 The basic
idea behind the plan was that in return for more lending from the Bank, debt-ridden devel-
oping countries would undertake structural reforms to ensure long-term growth and to pay off
debts to private U.S. banks.165
But there was a catch: implementing the Baker Plan would require a general capital increase
for the IBRD. A general capital increase, of course, could be achieved only if Congress was will-
ing to supply the necessary funds. Until the Reagan administration could satisfy Congress that
its concerns were being addressed and that its instructions were being followed, the adminis-
tration would have a difficult time securing those funds. Senator Robert Kasten, a conservative
Republican from Wisconsin, chaired the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations at the time.166 To the environmental advocates’ pleasant surprise, Kasten
embraced their arguments. He did not hesitate to make repeated—and credible—threats to cut
the Bank’s funding167 (and thereby derail the Baker Plan).
It is worth considering whether the Treasury Department would have pursued environmen-
tal reform in the absence of Congress’s threats to cut funding. As background, Baker, like other
second-term Reagan appointees, was more pragmatic and less ideological than his predecessor,
and Reagan’s first-term domestic environmental deregulatory efforts had generated consider-
able political backlash.168 Moreover, one of the administration’s main objections to domestic
environmental regulations—the costs that they impose on domestic business—did not apply
in the Bank context; the costs of making the Bank a more environmentally sensitive institution
would largely be borne by the Bank and its borrowers.169 Even so, it seems unlikely that the
administration would have made environmental reform a high priority in the absence of sus-
tained pressure from Congress. In 1984, Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary James Conrow
testified that until Congress held its first set of hearings on the Bank’s handling of environmen-
tal issues, he was completely unaware that any problems existed.170 In addition, the environ-
mental reform goals were in some tension with the policy prescriptions that the administration
sought to encourage through structural-adjustment loans. Such lending appealed to the Rea-
gan administration as a mechanism to improve the environment for investment in developing
163 BABB, supra note 32, at 132.
164 1 DEVESH KAPUR, JOHN PRIOR LEWIS & RICHARD WEBB, THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CEN-
TURY 626–27 [hereinafter 1 THE WORLD BANK].
165 Wade, supra note 143, at 668; BABB, supra note 32, at 128–31.
166 Wade, supra note 143, at 663.
167 RICH, supra note 150, at 126–46.
168 Lazarus, supra note 147, at 85–87.
169 Cf. Wade, supra note 143, at 664 (“Leading the fight to reform the Bank’s environmental performance would
also earn [Senator Kasten] electoral credit from the strong environmental movement back home in Wisconsin with-
out incurring the wrath of Wisconsin’s environmentally unfriendly industries.”).
170 Draft Recommendations on the Multilateral Banks and the Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l
Dev. Inst. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 11 (1984) (“In appearing before
you in June 1983, I could honestly say that I was unaware of particular problems in these aspects of the [multilateral
development bank] programs.”).
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countries by shrinking their governments’ involvement in their economies.171 By contrast,
pursuing Congress’s environmental goals required the Bank’s international civil servants, as
well as the governments in the borrowing states, not only to take on new responsibilities but
to do more rather than less.
In any event, the Bank responded to persistent pressure from the United States and other
member states by making a series of highly visible organizational changes. In May 1987, Bank
president Barber Conable established a new department with both a significantly larger staff
and more authority than its predecessor, the Office of Environmental and Scientific Affairs.172
Satisfied that these developments reflected genuine progress, Congress appropriated funds for
the capital increase in 1988.
The Availability of Threats to Cut Funding
Threats to cut funding are a powerful motivator, but they are not always available. When
the executive branch is itself seeking to reduce funding for an international organization, Con-
gress gains little by threatening additional funding cuts.
Recall, for example, the instructions that Congress passed in 1977 requiring opposition to
loans to countries that engaged in consistent patterns of human rights violations.173 Although
Reagan administration officials indicated that they would observe the requirements of the
human rights provision,174 their implementation was grudging during Reagan’s first term in
office. In particular, because the voting instructions required public disapproval of these states
for their human rights records, they contravened the State Department’s preference for “tra-
ditional” diplomacy.175 Within six months of President Reagan’s inauguration, administra-
tion officials informed members of Congress that they would no longer oppose loans to Argen-
tina, Chile, Paraguay, South Korea, or Uruguay.176
Incredulous members of Congress cited the State Department’s own evidence that the fre-
quency and gravity of human rights violations remained high, especially in Argentina.177 The
administration argued that, because these countries’ human rights records were improving, the
statutory criterion of a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights” was no longer met—and therefore that the statute no longer required U.S.
opposition.178 Some, including Senator Edward Kennedy, accused the administration of
171 Statement by President Ronald Reagan upon Signing H.R. 1777, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1547
(Dec. 28, 1987) (objecting on constitutional foreign policy grounds to provisions that require the initiation of
foreign negotiations and the termination of the U.S.-Soviet Embassy Agreements, and that prohibited diplomatic
contact with the Palestine Liberation Organization).
172 PHILIPPE LE PRESTRE, THE WORLD BANK AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE 198–201 (1989);
Wade, supra note 143, at 674–75.
173 See supra note 102.
174 Human Rights and U.S. Policy in the Multilateral Development Banks: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Int’l
Dev. Inst. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 48 (1981) (statement of Ernest
B. Johnston Jr., senior deputy assistant secretary of state) (“In casting our future votes . . . , we will observe statutory
requirements of the International Financial Institutions Act.”).
175 Id. at 37 (statement of Walter J. Stoessel Jr., under secretary of state for political affairs), 49–50.
176 Id. at 25 (statement of Ernest B. Johnson Jr., senior deputy assistant secretary of state).
177 Id. at 142 (statement of Representative Jerry M. Patterson).
178 Id. at 25 (statement of Ernest B. Johnston Jr., senior deputy assistant secretary of state).
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blatantly disregarding the law.179 Representative Harkin, who initially sponsored the human
rights instructions, announced that he would explore cutting funds for the multilateral
banks.180
But the administration itself already planned to reduce U.S. financial support for the mul-
tilateral banks—which meant that reduced funding would actually implement the executive
branch’s preferences instead of depriving it of something that it wanted.181 Congress then
resorted to more legislation: it deleted the word “consistent” from the human rights provision,
with the consequence that any pattern of human rights violations (not just a consistent one)
would trigger the requirement to oppose loans.182
The Reagan administration’s efforts to evade the law’s requirements persisted. Testifying
before a House subcommittee hearing in 1985, Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams
declared: “This is not a good law.”183 Over the past two years, he said, the United States had
opposed some loans to Chile, but more often than not it had voted in favor of them.184 Abrams
pointed out that the deletion of the word “consistent” did not eliminate the need to make a
judgment call about whether a “pattern of human rights violations” existed.185 Indeed, when
achieving a specific human rights policy goal required voting in favor of a loan to Chile, he said
that he would interpret the voting instructions to permit the favorable vote—“unless I abso-
lutely can’t.”186
By 1987, the Reagan administration was seeking support for a general capital increase at the
Bank and struck a far more conciliatory tone. Testifying with Abrams before the same sub-
committee, a Treasury official described extensive negotiations preceding a recent vote on
another loan to Chile. He said it was the “first [case] in my memory where we have engaged
in an effort to try to secure other countries’ support of our efforts on the human rights issue
in the development banks.”187 The desire for funding matters.
The threat of funding cuts will also be unavailable when international organizations do not
require regular financial support from member states. Until the IDA was established in 1960,
the Bank was such an organization. The IBRD was established in 1945 but did not get sig-
nificant additional capital from its member states until 1980.188 The IBRD raised most of its
funds in the private capital markets, which meant that its operations “inflicted minimal pain
on taxpayers in the ‘donor’ countries.”189 This relative financial independence made it easier
179 John M. Goshko, Administration Reiterates Aim of Scuttling Carter Rights Policies, WASH. POST, July 10,
1981, at A12.
180 Id.
181 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
182 An Act Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-181, §1004, 97 Stat. 1153, 1286 (1983).
183 Human Rights and U.S. Voting Policy in the Development Banks: The Case of Chile: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Int’l Dev. Inst. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 60 (1985).
184 Id. at 65 (prepared statement of Elliott Abrams).
185 Id. at 69.
186 Id.
187 Current Directions for United States Policy Toward Chile: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Dev. Inst. & Fin.
of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 33 (1987).
188 The Bank’s first general capital increase, in 1959, provided the Bank with more callable capital but did not
require additional paid-in capital from member states. 1 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 164, at 12.
189 Id. at 2–3.
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for the IBRD to avoid the attention of both voters and members of Congress.190 Between the
Bank’s establishment in 1945 and the IDA’s establishment in 1960, Congress adopted only a
few statutes regarding the IBRD, all geared towards facilitating the sale of the IBRD’s secu-
rities.191
The IDA’s establishment changed the dynamics between member states and the Bank’s
management and also paved the way for greater congressional involvement. The former has
been widely acknowledged by commentators.192 The latter, however, has not. Because appro-
priating funds is Congress’s job, the establishment of the IDA empowered Congress to use
funding cuts to motivate the executive branch. And because of the shared infrastructure of the
IDA and IBRD,193 Congress has been able to use its leverage concerning the IDA as a means
of pursuing change not just in the IDA but also in the IBRD.
This change in dynamics did not occur immediately. More than a decade passed between
the IDA’s establishment and the burst of legislative activity described in part II. Why did it take
so long? The relatively modest size of IDA appropriations during the 1960s is one reason.194
During the 1970s, IDA replenishments grew steadily larger before leveling off in the 1980s.
The more money going to the Bank, the more attention Congress was likely to pay. And these
IDA replenishments were growing at a time that Congress became increasingly assertive across
a broad range of foreign policy issues.195 Finally, structural changes within Congress loosened
the grip of committee chairs over legislative output and made it easier for rank-and-file mem-
bers of Congress to affect the content of adopted legislation.196 Thus, the Bank’s own history
indicates that when international organizations are dependent on regular contributions from
member states, Congress is likely to pay more attention to the organization, and the executive
branch is likely to pay more attention to Congress and its policy preferences.
IV. THE PRESIDENT’S CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS
In 1988, toward the end of his first year in office, President George H. W. Bush reasserted
the executive branch’s constitutional authority with respect to the Bank. He issued two signing
statements that contested Congress’s authority to issue negotiation and voting instructions.
These signing statements raised the prospect of a dramatic break from the past. Before then,
presidents and executive branch officials neither acted nor spoke as if they had the constitu-
tional authority to ignore Congress’s instructions regarding the Bank.197 President Bush’s
190 Id. at 1120.
191 See An Act to Permit Investment of Fund of Insurance Companies Organized Within the District of Colum-
bia in Obligations of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Pub. L. No. 83-513, 68 Stat.
494 (1954) (permitting insurance companies organized within the District of Columbia to buy IBRD securities);
An Act to Further Amend Section 5136 of the Revised Statutes, as Amended, with Respect to Underwriting and
Dealing in Securities Issued by the Central Bank for Cooperatives, Pub. L. No 82-305, 66 Stat. 49 (1952); An Act
to Amend the National Bank Act and the Bretton Woods Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 81-142, 63 Stat. 298 (1949)
(authorizing national banks to purchase IBRD securities).
192 BABB, supra note 32, at 27; MASON & ASHER, supra note 36, at 88.
193 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
194 1 THE WORLD BANK , supra note 164, at 1131; Schoultz, supra note 83, at 544–45.
195 See generally, e.g., FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 53 (describing Congress’s growing activism in the wake
of the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam War).
196 LAVELLE, supra note 28, at 97–98; Gwin, supra note 45, at 220.
197 Cf. Barron & Lederman, supra note 57, at 952.
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assertions of exclusive constitutional authority threatened to take away one of the primary tools
that Congress has used to direct the executive branch—and to shape policy at the Bank. These
signing statements purported to give the Treasury Department more leeway to disregard Con-
gress’s demands, thereby making it much harder for Congress to replicate its successes from the
previous decade. If the president really was prepared to ignore congressional voting instruc-
tions, the conventional account would start to look more compelling.
Remarkably, however, on the ground there was no perceptible change.198 Repeated objec-
tions from the executive branch did not slow the pace of legislated negotiation instructions
regarding the Bank. More significantly, the signing statements had no discernible impact on
the Treasury Department’s implementation of Congress’s instructions: the department con-
tinued (and still continues) to diligently follow at least the letter of Congress’s instructions.
This on-the-ground reality may explain why these signing statements receive literally no men-
tion in detailed accounts of lobbying Congress to achieve environmental reform at the Bank.199
Why, then, did the Treasury Department continue to implement instructions that U.S.
executive directors deplored and that sometimes conflicted with executive branch policy pref-
erences? The answer lies in the diverging interests of different component parts of the executive
branch. Presidential signing statements are drafted by lawyers at the Justice Department’s
Office of Legal Counsel. As the “government’s chief watchdog on issues that implicate pres-
idential power,”200 one of office’s primary tasks is to object to perceived infringements.
Treasury Department officials, however, are far more reluctant to antagonize members of
Congress over constitutional questions.201 Treasury Department officials are the ones who
would face the fallout from disregarding Congress’s instructions. They are the ones who would
have to personally face the wrath of legislators in public hearings. Treasury Department offi-
cials are also the ones who must persuade Congress to appropriate funds for the Bank and other
international financial institutions. Congressional support for any kind of foreign aid is hard
to muster—and even harder when that aid is distributed by multilateral institutions.202 The
coalitions that support funding for the Bank are fragile and vulnerable to defections from mem-
bers on both the right and the left.203 If Treasury officials disregarded Congress’s instructions,
198 Signing statements asserting constitutional problems are sometimes, but not always, a prelude to the executive
branch’s non-enforcement of, or noncompliance with, the legislated provision. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Eric
A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 343 (2006); U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS ACCOMPANYING THE FISCAL YEAR
2006 APPROPRIATIONS ACTS, STUDY NO. B-308603 (2007) (reviewing nineteen provisions singled out in signing
statements issued by President George W. Bush and finding that ten provisions were executed as written, six were
not, and three were not triggered); John McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War
Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 310 n.81
(1993) (describing noncompliance with legislated provision regarding composition of U.S. delegation to specified
international meetings).
199 See, e.g., Bowles & Kormos, supra note 53 (discussing merits of constitutional objections to legislated instruc-
tions but not mentioning signing statements). Bruce Rich, a leader in the reform efforts, never mentions signing
statements in his book. See RICH, supra note 150.
200 Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 545 (2012).
201 See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 288 (1993)
(describing presidents and their legal advisers as able to “indulge in confrontations with Congress” on constitutional
questions, whereas executive agencies “cannot risk these types of collisions with the [congressional] committees that
authorize their programs and provide funds”).
202 BABB, supra note 32, at 13–15.
203 See, e.g., CAROL LANCASTER, FOREIGN AID: DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT, DOMESTIC POLITICS 76
(2007).
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securing funding for the international financial institutions could easily become impossible. As
Representative David Obey put it, “For any administration to say, Well, we will accept the
money, but ignore the limitations is to greatly increase the likelihood that they will not get the
money.”204 The converse is also true: the Treasury Department may be more likely to secure
the appropriations that it seeks for the Bank—or to secure larger appropriations—if it accepts
and implements Congress’s voting instructions. Given the choice between a smaller appropri-
ation with no accompanying voting or negotiation instructions and a larger appropriation that
does include voting or negotiation instructions, some Treasury officials have preferred the lat-
ter.205
Constitutional Objections Emerge
During George H. W. Bush’s term in office, Congress continued to legislate on the subject
of environmental reform. Both advocates and members of Congress viewed the 1987 organi-
zational changes at the Bank as improvements, but hardly sufficient to alleviate their con-
cerns.206 In particular, advocates wanted the Bank to analyze the environmental impact of proj-
ects before approving loans to support them. Congress’s efforts were not limited to
environmental reform, however; it adopted legislated instructions on a wide range of issues. At
the end of 1989, Congress enacted two separate bills that included mandatory negotiation and
voting instructions. The appropriations bill for fiscal year 1990 included instructions relating
to competition with U.S. producers,207 climate change,208 terrorism, 209 and loans to Pan-
ama.210 The following month, Congress adopted the International Development and Finance
Act (IDFA), which likewise included numerous negotiation and voting instructions.211 The
best known is the Pelosi Amendment (so named for its sponsor, Representative Nancy Pelosi).
The Pelosi Amendment required executive directors of multilateral development banks to vote
against any proposed loan unless an environmental impact assessment had been conducted at
least 120 days before the loan came before the executive directors for a vote.212 In addition, the
assessment had to be released to the executive directors, the rest of the Bank, affected groups,
and local NGOs before the U.S. executive director could support the project.213
204 155 CONG. REC. H7907 (daily ed. July 9, 2009).
205 Telephone interview with anonymous source familiar with U.S. participation in multilateral development
banks over the years (Mar. 13, 2012).
206 Wade, supra note 143, at 680; RICH, supra note 150, at 148–53.
207 An Act Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fis-
cal Year Ending September 30, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-167, §522, 103 Stat. 1195 (1989) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§262(h)) (requiring the use of the voice and vote of the United States to oppose assistance by the Bank for the pro-
duction or extraction of any commodity or mineral for export if the competition would injure U.S. producers).
208 Id., §533 (requiring vigorous promotion of programs to address global climate change by specified means,
including by augmenting and expanding the professional staff of the Bank with the requisite expertise).
209 Id., §563 (requiring opposition to loans to countries that have been designated by the secretary of state as state
sponsors of terrorism).
210 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
167, §561, 103 Stat. 1195 (1989).
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President Bush issued signing statements objecting to both the foreign appropriations bill
and the IDFA. The signing statement for the appropriations bill focused on a provision unre-
lated to the Bank, but included a general statement asserting “serious misgivings as to the con-
stitutionality and the wisdom of many provisions contained in the bill” and expressed an inten-
tion to “construe any constitutionally doubtful provisions in accordance with the requirements
of the Constitution.”214 A month later, the signing statement for the IDFA warned that “sev-
eral provisions [of the IDFA] warrant careful construction to avoid constitutional concerns”
and specifically cited “several sections [that] could be read to restrict executive authority to
determine the position of the United States at various multilateral development banks.”215 As
is typical, these signing statements did not include any analysis of the constitutional issues or
past practice regarding legislated negotiation instructions.
President Bush’s constitutional objections had no impact on the Treasury Department’s
long-standing practice of implementing Congress’s negotiation instructions. When Secretary
of Treasury Nicholas Brady appeared before a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee the fol-
lowing spring, neither his testimony nor the senators’ questions suggested that the Treasury
Department was treating legislated negotiation or voting instructions as optional. Brady’s pre-
pared statement acknowledged Congress’s instructions on various environmental issues with
no hint of objection.216 In a letter describing the Treasury Department’s implementation of
instructions in the 1990 appropriations bill to “promote vigorously” specified policies to
address climate change, Brady indicated that the Treasury Department had “already instructed
the U.S. Executive Directors to implement Section 533 and are working with them to explore
ways to implement these provisions in a useful manner.”217 Senator Kasten praised Brady for
“taking a very strong position.”218 As for the Pelosi Amendment, both Brady himself and out-
side observers reported that the Treasury Department and the U.S. executive director pressed
hard—and ultimately successfully—for a Bank decision to both undertake and publicly release
comprehensive environmental assessments.219
All things considered, the signing statements did not change the dynamic between the
branches that existed during the Reagan administration. There is no indication that Congress
began to doubt its constitutional authority; Congress continued to legislate negotiation and
voting instructions; and individual members continued to threaten funding cuts. Senator Pat-
rick Leahy, who chaired the Senate subcommittee hearing described above, indicated that he
would be reluctant to support any contribution to the Bank the following year unless he saw
dramatic improvement in the Bank’s environmental track record.220 During the previous year,
214 George H. W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1573 (Nov. 21, 1989).
215 George H. W. Bush, Statement on Signing the International Development and Finance Act of 1989, 25
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1973 (Dec. 25, 1989).
216 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991; Hearings on
H.R. 5114 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 101st Cong. 169, 180–81 (1990) [hereinafter
Hearings on H.R. 5114] (“This is an area in which we have received a substantial mandate from Congress to press
for wide-ranging reforms over the past several years. At last count, we had thirty-five separate legislative provisions
encouraging us to promote more rapid progress toward one or another environmental objective.”).
217 Id. at 195.
218 Id. at 193.
219 Wade, supra note 143, at 686–87.
220 Hearings on H.R. 5114, supra note 216, at 192 (statement of Senator Leahy).
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1989, Representative Obey, who chaired the relevant House appropriations subcommittee,
had initially refused to make any funds available to the Bank. The funds were not restored until
the House-Senate conference, and at the Senate’s request.221 Although Obey’s threat was not
directly related to environmental issues, the episode sensitized the Treasury Department to the
very real possibility that Congress might withhold funds.222 In 1990, President Bush was also
seeking Congress’s approval for participation in a new regional multilateral development bank,
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The need for affirmative congres-
sional action on this related issue likely further motivated the executive branch to address Con-
gress’s concerns. During the remainder of President Bush’s term, Congress continued to adopt
legislation directing votes and negotiation objectives. President Bush continued to issue sign-
ing statements objecting to those provisions.223 And the Treasury Department continued to
implement the legislated instructions.
This status quo largely continued during both of the following administrations. President
Bill Clinton issued signing statements objecting to some legislative provisions that he perceived
to interfere with his foreign affairs authority,224 including several signing statements objecting
to legislated instructions regarding the Bank.225 He raised objections less consistently, how-
ever, than his predecessor. President Clinton often signed, without comment, legislation that
included mandatory voting or negotiation instructions.226 Whether he objected or not, the
Treasury Department continued to act in accordance with Congress’s instructions.227 During
221 Bowles & Kormos, supra note 53, at 793.
222 Id.
223 George H. W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1991, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1770 (Nov. 12, 1990) (expressing concern about pro-
visions that “purport to direct, or forbid, negotiations with foreign governments or entities” and that “require the
executive branch . . . to present specific positions to international organizations”). The statute includes provisions
requiring the U.S. executive director to encourage greater reliance on field offices in assessing project proposals and
to hold open hearings in the borrowing country during project identification and preparation. See An Act Making
Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending Sep-
tember 30, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 1979 (1990).
224 See, e.g., William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Department of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judi-
ciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 3153 (Dec. 21, 2000)
(objecting to provisions regarding Kyoto protocol); William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Holocaust Vic-
tims Redress Act, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 263, 263 (Feb. 23, 1998) (objecting to a provision that “pur-
ports to direct the President on how to pursue negotiations with foreign states”).
225 See William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Pro-
grams Appropriations Act of 2001, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 2809 (Nov. 13, 2000); William J. Clinton,
Statement on Signing the Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS.
1906, 1907 (Aug. 28, 2000) (objecting to “provisions [that] seem to direct the Administration on how to proceed
in negotiations related to the development of the World Bank AIDS Trust Fund”); William J. Clinton, Statement
on Signing Consolidated Appropriations Legislation for Fiscal Year 2000, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 2458
(Dec. 6, 1999); William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemen-
tal Appropriations Act, 1999, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 2108 (Nov. 2, 1998); William J. Clinton, State-
ment on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOCS. 948 (May 9, 1994).
226 See, e.g., An Act Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-306, §§514, 526, 108 Stat. 1608, 1633 (1994).
227 See, e.g., Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 2001: Hearings Before
a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. 311 (2000) (“Under legislative sanctions imposed in
1998, we are required to oppose (i.e., abstain or vote ‘no’) any multilateral lending to India except for loans that
support basic human needs. In April 2000, we abstained on one IBRD loan and one IDA credit . . . in accordance
with this mandate.”) (response by Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers to question for the record).
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President George W. Bush’s administration, the status quo persisted; the only difference was
that he issued signing statements more consistently.228 By the end of his second term, Congress
and the executive branch had reached a practical accommodation, if not quite a resolution,
regarding their respective constitutional authority as to negotiations with the Bank.
Constitutional Confrontation
When President Obama assumed office, Congress’s practice of regularly enacting negoti-
ation instructions regarding the Bank dated back three-and-a-half decades. On paper, the pres-
ident had objected to this exercise of authority for two decades. On the ground, however, the
Treasury Department consistently implemented Congress’s instructions. Although the
Obama administration’s practice reflected continuity with previous administrations, he issued
a signing statement in June of 2009 that triggered a confrontation. In the end, however, the
confrontation changed nothing. Congress effectively defended its claim to authority to enact
mandatory negotiation and voting instructions. Although the executive branch did not explic-
itly concede Congress’s constitutional authority, President Obama has (at least thus far)
refrained from issuing additional signing statements concerning Congress’s Bank instructions,
and the Treasury Department has continued to act in accordance those instructions.
In his first six months in office, President Obama signed two appropriations bills that
included legislated negotiation and voting instructions regarding the Bank. The 2009 Omni-
bus Appropriations Act included instructions regarding loans to Burma and Zimbabwe, loans
for commodities or suppliers that competed with U.S. producers, and loans that imposed user
charges for primary education or primary health care.229 The 2009 Supplemental Appropri-
ations Act, adopted three months later, included instructions regarding loans to state sponsors
of terrorism, the Bank’s disclosure policies, and the terms of loans for extractive industries.230
In addition to these provisions, the legislation included a $100 billion credit line for the IMF,
together with instructions for the U.S. executive director of the IMF.231 The administration
had specifically requested the IMF credit line after President Obama pledged to support new
IMF funding to address the global financial crisis at the G-20 summit in London on April 2,
2009. President Obama issued statements objecting to these mandatory provisions in both bills
and indicating that he would not treat those provisions as “limiting [his] ability to negotiate
and enter into agreements with foreign nations.”232
The June 2009 signing statement provoked outrage among members of Congress for two
reasons. First, lining up support for the IMF funds that the president requested had not been
228 See, e.g., George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, 43 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOCS 1638 (Dec. 26, 2007); George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS 1718 (Nov. 14,
2005); U.S. Government Accountability Office, supra note 198, at 33–34 (finding that the Treasury Department
implemented voice-and-vote instructions notwithstanding constitutional objection made in signing statement).
229 See Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, §§7026, 7030(b), 7070(e), 7071(b), 123 Stat. 524
(2009).
230 See An Act Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-32, §§1110–12, 1404, 123 Stat. 1859 (2009).
231 See id., §§1112(d), 1404.
232 Barack Obama, Statement on Signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act 2009, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 145 (Mar. 11, 2009); see Barack Obama, Statement on Signing the Supplemental Appropriations Act 2009,
2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 501 ( June 24, 2009).
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easy. Lawmakers were particularly leery of providing additional funds to the IMF after earlier
efforts to rescue U.S. banks had proved politically controversial.233 The members of Congress
who supported the credit line to the IMF were angry that the reward for their successful efforts
was a signing statement that challenged the constitutionality of the very legislation that sup-
plied the requested funds. Second, the signing statements surprised lawmakers who had
expected a different practice from President Obama, given his criticisms, while campaigning,
of his predecessor’s use of signing statements.234
Members of Congress condemned the signing statement and threatened to withhold future
funds. Speaking on the floor, House Financial Services Chair Barney Frank bridled:
The notion that an administration can take the money and pick and choose what it
wants to do with the conditions is unacceptable. So let me say, as chairman of the com-
mittee that authorizes these [funds] and as someone who works closely with the appro-
priators in doing it, if the administration does not withdraw this claim that they can ignore
conditions we put on it, then they will have nothing to ignore because there won’t be any
conditions and there won’t be any money.235
The House collectively registered its fury over the signing statement by subsequently approv-
ing—by a vote of 429 to 2—an amendment to another pending appropriations bill that would
have barred any use of funds inconsistent with the provisions targeted by the president’s June
signing statement.236 Although the amendment was never enacted, then-Representative Mark
Kirk said, “[T]he signal that we’ve sent to the Treasury is very clear: Ignore [the] statute at your
extreme peril. And this is on behalf of a bipartisan, overwhelming majority.”237
Treasury Department officials were distraught.238 The signing statement “in effect under-
cut something to which the Treasury Department had agreed,” and “antagonized people with
[whom] Treasury would have to deal on many other matters.”239 Although they were told that
that the signing statement was coming,240 Treasury officials did not have a meaningful oppor-
tunity to object. Seeking to control the damage, the Treasury Department immediately reas-
sured members of Congress that it would abide by the legislated instructions.241 Treasury Sec-
retary Timothy Geithner repeated this assurance several months later in a question for the
233 Bob Davis & Greg Hitt, Major IMF Contribution Faces Resistance in U.S. Congress, WALL ST. J., June 10,
2009, at A6.
234 See, e.g., Anne Flaherty, Democrats Irked by President’s Signing Statement: Obama Criticized George W. Bush
for Doing the Same, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 2009, at 8.
235 155 CONG. REC. H7907 (daily ed. July 9, 2009); see supra note 204 and accompanying text. Representatives
Frank and Obey, along with two other colleagues, sent a letter to President Obama reiterating both the complaint
about the signing statement and the accompanying threat to cut funding. See Letter from Barney Frank and David
Obey to President Obama ( July 21, 2009), reprinted in Press Release, House Financial Services–Democrats, House
Chairs Warn President of Dangers of Signing Statements ( June 21, 2009), at http://democrats.financialservices.
house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID515.
236 See 155 CONG. REC. H7907 (daily ed. July 9, 2009) (reproducing amendment offered by Representative
Kirk on behalf of Representative Granger); id. at H7913 (recording 429-2 vote in favor).
237 Id. at H7908 (statement of Representative Kirk).
238 Telephone interview with Edwin (Ted) Truman, former Treasury Department Assistant Secretary for Inter-
national Affairs (1998–2001) and Counselor to the Secretary (2009) (Mar. 13, 2012).
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 See id. (statement of Representative Frank) (“I’ve been told by Treasury they intend to abide by them.”).
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record.242 A Treasury Department manual updated a year after the confrontation warned staff:
“Your compliance with these provisions is vital to Treasury policy interests within the IFIs
[international financial institutions]. Congressional support for U.S. participation in the IFIs
is dependent in part on how well Treasury implements these provisions.”243
In this instance the president himself also backed away—at least a little bit. After the con-
frontation over the June 2009 signing statement, the Obama administration modified its prac-
tice concerning such statements. Since that date, two separate appropriations bills have been
passed that included legislated instructions regarding the Bank.244 Several of these provisions
were either identical or very similar to provisions in previous bills that had elicited objections
in signing statements.245 Both bills included new language directing votes on loans to Sri
Lanka.246 Neither bill was the subject of a signing statement, but a White House spokesperson
explained that the absence of a signing statement did not signal a change in views about the
constitutionality of legislated instructions: “The administration’s views about certain provi-
sions in the omnibus spending statement had previously been publicly communicated so it
wasn’t necessary to duplicate them in a signing statement.”247
In the end, the Obama administration did not concede the constitutionality of the legislated
negotiation and voting instructions—but it did choose to avoid additional direct confronta-
tions with Congress. Thus, although administrations over the last two decades have reserved
the option to decline to follow Congress’s instructions, they have not acted on that reservation.
The need to secure congressional funding has also convinced the Treasury Department that,
regardless of the constitutional arguments made in signing statements, the department cannot
afford to ignore Congress’s negotiation instructions. Congress’s threats to cut funding have
consequently done more than motivate the executive branch to pursue specific policy goals.
Those threats have helped Congress defend its role in instructing U.S. executive directors as
to how they should go about their day-to-day interactions with the Bank.
242 See The U.S. and the G-20: Remaking the International Economic Architecture: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 36 (2009) (responding to a question for the record, Geithner stated, “Treasury takes
very seriously its responsibility to carry out the legislative mandates that apply to U.S. participation in the six [inter-
national financial institutions].”).
243 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 16, at 1.
244 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, §§7026(c), 7030(b), 7070(i), 7071(b)(1),
7089(e),123 Stat. 3034 (2009); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, §§7025, 7029(b),
7042(j)(1), 7046(d)(4),125 Stat. 786 (2011).
245 Compare Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, §7026, 123 Stat. 524, with Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010, §7026(c), with Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, §7025(c) (containing identical
provisions regarding loans for commodities or minerals that compete with U.S. producers); compare Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2009, §7030, with Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, §7030(b) (containing nearly iden-
tical language regarding loans that would require user fees or services charges on poor people for primary education
or primary health care); compare Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, §7070(e)(1), with Consolidated Appropri-
ations Act, 2012, §7042(j), and Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, §7070(i) (regarding loans to Zimbabwe);
compare Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, §7071(b), with Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, §7071(b),
and Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, §7044(b) (regarding loans to Burma).
246 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, §7089; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, §7046(d)(4).
247 Charlie Savage, Obama Takes New Route to Opposing Parts of Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, at A10 (quoting
White House spokesperson Ben LaBolt).
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V. MONITORING AND OVERSIGHT
To effectively influence Bank policy, Congress needs comprehensive, high-quality, and
timely information about the Bank and its activities. Without it, Congress cannot make
informed assessments about whether the Bank’s activities are diverging from its preferences and
whether new instructions to the executive branch are necessary. Congress also needs informa-
tion about how the executive branch is discharging legislated instructions. This latter type of
information is vital because the executive branch can thwart Congress’s preferences by half-
heartedly implementing Congress’s legislated instructions. Threats to cut funding can provide
additional motivation, but they cannot be credibly made for every single instruction that Con-
gress enacts, especially as the number and diversity of legislated instructions have surged in
recent years.
Effective monitoring is therefore essential, but it is also difficult. The readiest source of infor-
mation is the executive branch itself, but the information that it provides may be self-serving
or otherwise unreliable.248 And as explained below, to the extent that Congress seeks to sup-
plement or verify information supplied by administration officials with information from the
Bank, Congress faces considerable barriers unless the information that it seeks is already avail-
able to the public.
There is also the issue of cost. Collecting and processing information requires a significant
investment of time, and time is in short supply for members of Congress and their staffs. The
more costly it is to gather information about the activities of the Bank (and executive branch),
the less likely it is that Congress will make the requisite effort. Likewise, the more difficult it
is for Congress to determine whether the executive branch is complying with legislated instruc-
tions, the less inclined members will be to engage in monitoring, and the more inclined the
executive branch will be to ignore congressional preferences.249
Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz famously divided congressional oversight into
two categories: police patrols and fire alarms.250 Police patrols are the classic, visible, and time-
consuming forms of congressional oversight, including hearings and requirements that the
executive branch submit reports. Fire alarms, by contrast, enlist outside groups to review
administrative actions for consistency with congressional goals.251 Fire alarms are attractive to
Congress because they reduce the cost of monitoring the executive branch. Administrative law
procedures are a widely used form of fire alarm in the context of domestic regulation, but they
generally do not apply in foreign policy contexts, including the interactions between the Trea-
sury Department and the Bank.252
Given, then, that Congress has a limited toolkit, how does it attempt to monitor the Bank
and the executive branch? As we will see below, while some informational asymmetries remain,
especially between Congress and the executive branch, Congress has succeeded in shrinking
them over time.
248 See infra notes 274–75 and accompanying text.
249 JAMES M. LINDSAY, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 115 (1994).
250 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire
Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 168 (1984).
251 Id. at 166.
252 Stewart, supra note 12, at 80. For an example of how administrative law procedures can be applied to an inter-
national regime, see Barr & Miller, supra note 29, at 29–31.
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Monitoring the Bank
Since its establishment in 1945, the Bank has made available basic information regarding
its operations to the public at large. It has, for example, published regular annual reports that
disclose the identity of loan recipients and the size of the loans received.253 This information
provided a sufficient basis for the kinds of instructions that Congress legislated during the
1970s, which focused primarily on the identity of borrowing states.
Congress’s efforts to make the Bank’s operations more environmentally sensitive during the
1980s and 1990s demanded much more information, which was not easy to obtain. First, Con-
gress had to learn about the environmental consequences of certain Bank projects. The projects
were all located abroad, which made it harder to gather information about them. The reports
drafted by the Bank for public consumption did not provide any indication of the potential
environmental problems associated with the projects.254
Second, once the Bank adopted measures to elevate environmental concerns in its lending
decisions, Congress needed information to determine whether those measures were effective
or whether additional steps were necessary. Distinguishing cosmetic from genuine changes is
not an easy task, and commentators continue to dispute the significance of various alterations
to the Bank’s operations.255
Finally, several provisions in the Bank’s charter hinder congressional efforts to extract infor-
mation about the Bank beyond what is publicly available. The charter specifies that members
are to “deal with the Bank only through its Treasury, central bank, stabilization fund or other
similar fiscal agency, and the Bank shall deal with members only by or through the same agen-
cies.”256 The Bank’s immunities present another obstacle. Both the Bank’s officials and its doc-
uments—like those of other international organizations—are protected.257 Bank officials are
beyond the reach of Congress’s subpoena power and are generally unavailable to testify before
Congress.258 The Bank’s immunities also limit Congress’s ability to enlist the Congressional
Research Service and Government Accountability Office to investigate and report on the
Bank’s operations.259 The Bank can waive these immunities, but—at least as a formal matter—
Congress cannot require it to do so.260
Undaunted, Congress has turned to three different tools to surmount these obstacles. First,
it has pressured the executive branch to provide information that it has available to it through
253 See Schoultz, supra note 83, at 546.
254 Wade, supra note 143, at 614–15 (describing shortcomings in the Bank’s reporting regime before 1987 as
“too weak to pick up more than egregious cases of damage, and perhaps not all of those”); see also RICH, supra note
150, at 113 n.*.
255 Compare, e.g., Nielson & Tierney, supra note 53, with Tamar Gutner, World Bank Environmental Reform:
Revisiting Lessons from Agency Theory, 59 INT’L ORG. 773, 778–79 (2005).
256 IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. III, §2.
257 See 22 U.S.C. §288(a), (d); Exec. Order No. 9751, 11 Fed. Reg. 7713 ( July 11, 1946); Exec. Order No.
11966, 42 Fed. Reg. 4331 ( Jan. 19, 1977).
258 There were some exceptions in the Bank’s very early history: in 1948 and 1949, IBRD officials testified vol-
untarily before several congressional committees. Jonathan Sanford & Margaret Goodman, Congressional Oversight
and the Multilateral Development Banks, 29 INT’L ORG. 1055, 1056 n.2 (1975).
259 Id. at 1060–61; see also STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 111TH CONG., REPORT ON THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A CALL FOR CHANGE 18 (Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter A
CALL FOR CHANGE] (citing the Government Accountability Office’s lack of access to Bank officials to complete
report requested by members of Congress).
260 See 22 U.S.C. §288a(b), d(b).
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its role in supervising the U.S. executive director.261 Second, members of Congress and their
staffs have informal access to additional information about the Bank. Notwithstanding the
requirement in the Bank’s charter that the Bank interact only with the Treasury Department,
members of Congress and their staffs are in ongoing contact with Bank officials.262 In an inter-
view, one former Senate staffer stated: “The Bank made every effort to respond to requests and
provide information—even if it was publicly unavailable.”263
Third, Congress has successfully sought to increase the amount of publicly available infor-
mation about the Bank. It has done so by relying on the same tools described earlier in this
article: voting instructions to the executive branch and threats to cut funding.264 Responding
in part to pressure from Congress and the U.S. executive director, the Bank significantly revised
its information disclosure policies in the fall of 1993.265 Under the new Bank policy and pro-
cedures, more Bank documents became publicly available, including project information doc-
uments, factual technical information, final staff appraisal reports, and environmental impact
assessments. Congress has continued to call for greater transparency.266 The Bank further
revised its information policy in 2010, making even more documents available.267 By working
to increase the amount of information that is available directly from the Bank, Congress has
reduced not only the obstacle posed by the Bank’s immunity. It also significantly reduced the
information advantage that the executive branch has over Congress by virtue of the former’s
supervision of the U.S. executive director and its more regular contact with the Bank. Thus,
Congress’s successes at the international level have a feedback effect: they facilitate future suc-
cesses in motivating the executive branch to pursue Congress’s preferred policies.
Publicly available information can work like a fire alarm. It allows other parties—including
NGOs—to monitor the Bank’s actions and to approach Congress when they perceive prob-
lems. In effect, public availability allows Congress to “crowdsource” the job of monitoring the
Bank and reduces the resources that Congress must itself devote to gathering and processing
information from the Bank. Congress also actively pressed to establish the World Bank Inspec-
tion Panel, another institution that enlists outside parties in the task of monitoring the Bank.268
The inspection panel allows individuals in borrowing countries to challenge the Bank’s com-
pliance with its own procedures and policies. It thereby reinforces the Bank’s compliance with
the environmental assessment requirements that the Pelosi Amendment helped bring
261 See Sanford & Goodman, supra note 258, at 1059–61.
262 A CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 259, at 3 (noting that Senator Lugar met personally with the head of each
multilateral development bank); Bowles & Kormos, supra note 53, at 808 n.212.
263 Interview with Nilmini Gunaratne Rubin, former Senior Professional Staff Member for Senator Richard
Lugar (Mar. 29, 2012).
264 See, e.g., Bowles & Kormos, supra note 53, at 801; Wade, supra note 143, at 727; Lori Udall, The World Bank
and Public Accountability, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASS-
ROOTS MOVEMENTS 403 ( Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998).
265 IBRAHIM F.I SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL 22–23 (2d ed. 2000).
266 See A CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 259.
267 See World Bank, News and Broadcast, World Bank Broadens Public Access to Information ( July 1, 2010),
at http://go.worldbank.org/L3HF51WOX0.
268 See IBRD Resolution 93-10 (1993); IDA Resolution 93-6 (1993); see also Bowles & Kormos, supra note 53,
at 801–07 (describing legislated instructions and threats to cut funding, specifically in relation to the establishment
of the Inspection Panel).
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about.269 Both the Bank’s evolving transparency policies and the establishment of the inspec-
tion panel have reduced Congress’s informational disadvantages and empowered it to play a
more active role in setting policy regarding the Bank.
Monitoring the Executive Branch
In the absence of administrative law procedures for monitoring the executive branch’s inter-
actions with the Bank, Congress has two classic “police patrol” oversight tools at its disposal:
hearings and reporting requirements. Since the Bank’s establishment in 1945, Congress has
relied heavily on both. Congress holds regular hearings at which Treasury Department officials
have testified about U.S. actions and policies regarding the Bank.270 One commentator
observed that as the volume of legislation regarding the Bank increased over time, so, too, did
the rank of the testifying Treasury official: by the end of the 1970s, the Treasury secretary him-
self was testifying.271
Reporting requirements also date back to the very beginning of the Bank’s history. In 1945,
Congress required the executive branch to provide periodic reports on the United States’ par-
ticipation in the IBRD and the IMF.272 More recently, reporting requirements on specific top-
ics have proliferated. 273 Hearings and reporting requirements may work well for policing com-
pliance with the letter of Congress’s instructions, but Congress’s biggest challenge is to
motivate the executive branch to do more than that. The Treasury Department’s reports, for
example, may not be especially helpful in Congress’s effort to determine whether the executive
branch merely went through the motions; the department has an incentive to present infor-
mation in a way that reflects favorably upon it.274 In particular, the Treasury Department may
be tempted to overstate the obstacles that it encounters in efforts to persuade other executive
directors or the Bank’s management to shift their positions. Congress is hard-pressed to know
whether the Treasury Department and the U.S. executive director made only halfhearted
efforts or whether they encountered genuinely unmovable opposition.275 Congress lacks access
to independent information about the substance and intensity of other member states’ pref-
erences.
269 See generally Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 15, at 292; Nielson & Tierney, supra note 53 (describing
Inspection Panel as an example of fire-alarm oversight).
270 Congressional hearings, like threats to cut funding, are not subject to the collective action problems that beset
legislating. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 8, at 446.
271 BABB, supra note 32, at 69.
272 BWAA, supra note 37, §4(b)(5), (6).
273 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §262r-6 (2006) (requiring annual reports on actions that borrowing countries have taken
to strengthen governance and reduce bribery and corruption).
274 D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION 31–32 (1991) (“The
agent has incentives to shade things . . . or to reveal information in some other strategic manner. . . . Even if agents
can somehow be constrained to be truthful in their reports, the principal will still not know what they are not report-
ing.”).
275 Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation Under Anarchy:
States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney eds.,
2006) (“If the principal observes an unsatisfactory outcome, it cannot tell for sure whether this was the result of slack
by the agent, in which case the latter should be sanctioned, or some unfortunate event that disrupted the best efforts
of a sincere agent, who should not be punished.”).
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One solution is more intense monitoring. When Congress pays sustained attention to a sin-
gle issue or instruction over time, the executive branch will feel more pressure to demonstrate
responsiveness to Congress’s instructions and to demonstrate the efficacy of its efforts in shift-
ing Bank policy. Congress can also enlist its own staff or the Government Accountability
Office to undertake more extensive evaluations of the executive branch’s compliance with its
instructions.276 These reports typically rely on a range of sources outside the Treasury Depart-
ment, including other agencies, NGOs, and sometimes the Bank itself, and can thus provide
a fuller picture of the force and effectiveness of the executive branch’s efforts.277
Congress has also undertaken, at least indirectly, to enlist actors outside the government to
help it police the executive branch. For example, by requiring the Treasury Department to
make certain kinds of information accessible on its website,278 Congress has facilitated both
police-patrol oversight (because members of Congress can review that information) and fire-
alarm oversight (because the posted information will be easily accessible to the broader public
and organized private interest groups that may, in turn, flag problems for members of Con-
gress).
Information from the Bank itself can also strengthen Congress’s hand by reinforcing its
capacity to police the executive branch. Among other things, the 2010 revisions to the Bank’s
information disclosure policy make minutes of the executive directors’ board meetings avail-
able shortly after the conclusion of the relevant meeting.279 The availability of comprehensive
information from the Bank should make it easier for members of Congress and interested out-
side groups to verify the executive branch’s accounts of its implementation of Congress’s
instructions. The Bank’s enhanced transparency policy also puts Congress, as well as outside
groups, in a better position to evaluate the extent to which their preferences are being translated
into policy.
VI. GENERALIZABILITY
In sum, the claim that international organizations undermine democracy by undermining
legislatures has no empirical foundation in relation to Congress and the Bank. But how likely
276 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL OVERSIGHT: U.S.
AGENCIES FOLLOW CERTAIN PROCEDURES REQUIRED BY LAW, BUT HAVE LIMITED IMPACT (2008); U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MORE EFFECTIVE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION NEEDED IN WORLD BANK
AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, REP. B-161470 (1973); A CALL FOR CHANGE, supra
note 259; 1977 STAFF REPORT, supra note 82.
277 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 276, at 25–26 (describing sources).
278 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, §581, 118 Stat. 3, 202–04 (2004) (codified
at 22 U.S.C. §262o-3) (requiring online posting of all negative votes and abstentions made by U.S. executive direc-
tors at any multilateral development institution); Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropri-
ations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-102, §599B, 119 Stat. 2172, 2241–43 (2005) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §262o-4(e))
(requiring online posting of explanations of U.S. positions on proposals that would have a significant effect on the
environment).
279 World Bank, The World Bank Policy on Access to Information, para. 23 ( July 1, 2010), at http://go.world
bank.org/L3HF51WOX0. Verbatim transcripts of board meetings, as well as statements of executive directors and
staff in the context of board meetings, remain unavailable to the public under the new policy for a period of ten years.
Id., para. 33.
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is Congress to be able to achieve similar results with other international organizations?280 As
the Bank example demonstrates, Congress’s efficacy in influencing an international organiza-
tion depends both on domestic political dynamics and on features of the international orga-
nization itself. In considering whether the Bank example is typical, it is helpful to break out
three distinct questions. Are there features of the Bank that make Congress especially moti-
vated to become involved in Bank policy? Do these features facilitate Congress’s ability to per-
suade the executive branch to adopt Congress’s policy preferences or to follow its negotiation
and voting instructions? And finally, are there unique features of the Bank that improve the
likelihood that Congress will succeed in securing adoption of its preferred policies at the inter-
national level?
This part of the article considers and ultimately rejects several possible reasons why the Bank
may be unique (or close to it) in ways that facilitate Congress’s involvement or amplify its influ-
ence. First, one might think that Congress is unusually motivated to become involved in shap-
ing Bank policy because of the subject matter of the Bank’s operations. Second, perhaps Con-
gress is especially likely to become involved, and the executive branch is especially solicitous of
Congress’s preferences, because U.S. participation in the Bank was authorized by congressio-
nal-executive agreement. Finally, perhaps the Bank is atypical because of the United States’ dis-
proportionate degree of influence there. It turns out, however, that each of these attributes is
either incidental to Congress’s successes regarding the Bank or widely shared among interna-
tional organizations in which the United States participates; if the Bank example is unrepre-
sentative, it must be for other reasons.
This part closes with a brief comparison of the Bank and the IMF that suggests one limit on
the generalizability of the Bank example: Congress’s ability to influence the Bank is unlikely
to be replicable with organizations that do not require regular funding. Because such organi-
zations are rare, however, this limitation is not a significant one.
Subject Matter and Congressional Motivation
Perhaps the Bank is a special case, and Congress is unusually motivated to become involved
in policymaking regarding the Bank because of the subject matter with which it deals. The
Bank’s activities significantly overlap with Congress’s constitutional authority.281 Congress
appropriates and directs foreign aid, and establishes and directs U.S. agencies (for example, the
Export-Import Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development) that, like the Bank,
provide grants and loans to foreign governments. Legislation on foreign aid reflects substantive
policy choices.282 Focusing attention on the Bank could be appealing, especially for members
of Congress looking to gain support from particular interest groups or to bolster their repu-
tations in the foreign relations field (perhaps with an eye toward seeking higher office).283
280 A related question (one that is beyond the scope of this article) is whether legislatures in other member states
can replicate Congress’s success. To the extent that Congress is aided by the United States’ disproportionate influ-
ence over the Bank, Congress’s successes may be difficult for other legislatures to replicate.
281 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s constitutional authority relevant to the
Bank’s work).
282 See generally LANCASTER, supra note 203, at 62–109 (describing shifts in congressional approaches to foreign
aid policy over time).
283 LINDSAY, supra note 249, at 40–43.
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There is good reason to believe, however, that other international organizations would be
even more likely than the Bank to motivate congressional action. Members of Congress are
most likely to become interested in international organizations if their constituents are.284 And
their constituents are most likely to become interested in those international organizations that
directly impose costs or confer benefits on them.285 Along this crucial dimension, the Bank—
compared to other organizations—is likely to be unworthy of members’ time and attention.
The primary cost that the Bank imposes on the United States is the opportunity cost: the
money that Congress appropriates for the Bank could be spent elsewhere.286 Other interna-
tional organizations promise (or threaten) more significant benefits or costs than does the
Bank. Among international financial institutions, for example, the IMF’s decisions can confer
significant benefits on U.S. financial institutions. For that reason, banks specializing in whole-
sale and international banking—typically located in major financial centers such as Chicago,
New York, and San Francisco—engage in extensive lobbying efforts regarding the IMF.287
The Montreal Protocol requires that parties phase out the consumption and production of
specified ozone-depleting substances; the parties’ decisions about how quickly those substances
are phased out can both impose costs on users of those substances and generate benefits for busi-
nesses that manufacture alternative substances. Participation in the World Trade Organization
(W TO) requires dismantling protectionist measures and thereby benefits those businesses
that rely on imports or that are seeking to export their products, while imposing sometimes
substantial costs on those businesses that face increased competition from abroad. The Bank’s
ability to attract Congress’s attention is hardly unique.
Approval by Congressional-Executive Agreement
Another possibility is that the Bank is atypical among international organizations because
Congress authorized U.S. participation in the Bank by congressional-executive agreement. On
this hypothesis, approval by congressional-executive agreement made Congress more likely to
become involved in the Bank over time and also made the executive branch more accepting of
a significant congressional role in shaping Bank policy. The Bank’s early history suggests there
may be something to this: as discussed in part II, the executive branch’s eagerness to secure
authorization for U.S. participation in the IBRD and IMF by congressional-executive agree-
ment may explain the executive branch’s failure to object to the negotiation instructions
included in that agreement.
There is no indication, however, that Congress’s approval by congressional-executive agree-
ment in 1945 influenced subsequent actions or reactions of either Congress or the executive
branch. None of the later discussions about the constitutionality or desirability of Congress’s
negotiation instructions referenced either Congress’s initial role in approving participation in
the Bank or the inclusion of negotiation instructions in the Bretton Woods Agreements Act.
284 Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the
Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1125 (2011) (“There is nary a political scientist who does not believe that
the electoral connection—whether viewed as a rosy aim to further the public good or a craven attempt to extract
interest-group rents—is Congress’s most distinctive feature.”).
285 Moe & Howell, supra note 5, at 147.
286 Bradley & Kelley, supra note 15, at 16.
287 See J. Lawrence Broz & Michael Brewster Hawes, US Domestic Politics and International Monetary Fund Pol-
icy, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 275, at 77, 77 n.2.
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During the recent row over President Obama’s signing statement, members of Congress linked
the appropriateness of the negotiation instructions to Congress’s role in funding the Bank’s
operations,288 but Congress would retain the authority to appropriate funds for the Bank even
if the Bank’s charter had been approved as an Article II treaty.
Even upon the assumption that approval by congressional-executive agreement did matter,
nothing distinguishes the Bank, in this context, from other international organizations for
which such agreements were used. Majorities in both houses of Congress, rather than two-
thirds of the Senate, have authorized U.S. participation in many other trade and financial orga-
nizations.289 Although the UN Charter was approved as an Article II treaty, the record for the
specialized agencies is split. Participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization, the UN
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the World Health Organization was
approved by congressional-executive agreement. Participation in the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the World Intellectual
Property Organization was approved by Article II treaty. The record on international organi-
zations dedicated to particular commodities is likewise split.290 The explanation for this pat-
tern of approval is uncertain,291 and it is not all obvious why members of Congress (or their
constituents) would be systematically more motivated to shape policy in international orga-
nizations that were approved by congressional-executive agreement.
What is more, Congress often plays a significant role in implementing Article II treaties, as
when it adopts implementing legislation after the Senate’s consent to ratification.292 Imple-
menting legislation gives both chambers of Congress the opportunity to influence the United
States’ participation in the new international organization. It may also carve out an ongoing
role for Congress and facilitate its ability to keep close tabs on the executive branch. For exam-
ple, the United States joined the International Coffee Organization in 1963 after the Senate
consented to ratification of the International Coffee Agreement.293 The Agreement was
designed to control coffee prices through a system of export quotas.294 Congress doled out
implementing authority to the executive branch in remarkably short, time-limited increments.
The initial implementing legislation, adopted in May 1965, provided import and export
288 See subsection “Constitutional Confrontation” in part IV, above.
289 This process has been followed for the other organizations that make up the World Bank Group as well as
for the IMF, regional development banks, the W TO, and commissions established by the North American Free
Trade Agreement, including the Commission for Environmental Cooperation and the Commission for Labor
Cooperation.
290 For example, compare the International Cotton Institute (participation approved by legislation) with the
International Coffee Organization (participation approved by two-thirds of the Senate).
291 Cf. Hathaway, supra note 13 (making this same point regarding the pattern for international agreements gen-
erally, not just those that create international organizations).
292 See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681–856 (following Senate consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13,
1993, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-21); Great Lakes Fishery Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 557, 70 Stat. 242 (following
Senate consent to ratification of the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, U.S.-Can., Sept. 10, 1954, 6 UST 2836);
International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act of 1957, Pub. L. 85-177, 71 Stat. 453 (following Senate
consent to ratification of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 UST 1093, 276
UNTS 3).
293 International Coffee Agreement, Aug. 28, 1957, Pub. L. 85-177, 14 UST 1911.
294 See generally ROBERT H. BATES, OPEN-ECONOMY POLITICS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
WORLD COFFEE TRADE 125–27 (1997).
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authority for a three-year period.295 In 1968, Congress extended this authority for a two-year
period, until 1970.296 The next two authorizations each lasted for less than a year.297
In the end, then, the method for approving U.S. participation does not appear to correlate
with Congress’s level of interest or to predict whether Congress’s efforts to shape policy regard-
ing that organization will be effective.
The United States’ Disproportionate Influence
The United States’ influence over the Bank may exceed that of other member states for a
number of reasons. Not only is the United States the Bank’s largest funder, but its vote is
weighted to reflect its financial contributions. The Bank president has historically always been
an American, and the Bank is located in Washington, DC, within a few miles of both the
United States Capitol and the White House. But are these sources of the United States’ dis-
proportionate influence unique to the Bank? Are they critical to Congress’s successes with
respect to the Bank?
Share of funding. The United States commonly supplies a large share of funding for inter-
national organizations and is frequently the member state that contributes the most. The share
of funds that the U.S. provides to the Bank (15 percent as of March 2013) is in the range of
what the United States contributes to other international organizations in which it partici-
pates.298 The United States supplies 22 percent of the United Nations’ regular budget, and 27
percent of the United Nations’ peacekeeping budget.299 The World Health Organization’s
scale of assessments tracks that of the United Nations’ regular budget; the United States sup-
plies 22 percent.300 The United States pays a smaller share of the W TO’s budget, about 12
percent, but it remains the largest contributor.301 For regional organizations, the United States’
share is often much higher. The United States supplies 33 percent of member state contribu-
tions to the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, and more than half of the member
state contributions to the Organization of American States.302 As part III explains, the size of
the U.S. funding share may well affect the Bank’s willingness to heed Congress’s concerns. But
the Bank is hardly unusual in receiving a significant share of its funds from the United States.
295 International Coffee Agreement Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-23, §2, 79 Stat. 112 (1965).
296 Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-634, §302, 82 Stat. 1345 (1968).
297 Coffee Agreement Act of 1968, Continuation, Pub. L. No. 91-694, §3, 84 Stat. 2077 (1971); An Act to Con-
tinue Until the Close of September 30, 1973, the International Coffee Agreement Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 92-262,
86 Stat. 113 (1972).
298 See supra note 41.
299 GA Res. 64/248 (Feb. 5, 2010); Report of the Secretary-General, Implementation of General Assembly Res-
olutions 55/235 and 55/236, UN Doc. A/64/220 (Sept. 23, 2009); BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS
28–29 (2011).
300 World Health Assembly, Scale of Assessments for 2012–2013 (May 24, 2011), at http://apps.who.int/gb/
ebwha/pdf_files/WHA64/A64_R21-en.pdf.
301 World Trade Organization, Members’ Contributions to the W TO Budget and the Budget of the Appellate Body
for the Year 2011, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/contrib11_e.htm.
302 Organization of American States, Program-Budget of the Organization 2012, Annex II, tbl.A, at http://www.
oas.org/consejo/sp/CAAP/docs/Approved%20Program%20Budget%202012%20ENG%20_%20No%20posts.
pdf; 2008 Annual Report of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, App. 2, at http://www.iattc.org/
PDFFiles2/AnnualReports/IATTC-Annual-Report-2008.pdf.
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Weighted vote. International organizations that weight member states’ votes by their finan-
cial contributions are limited to international financial institutions, although other interna-
tional organizations give the United States a larger role in decision making in other ways. The
most prominent is the UN Security Council, where a resolution can be vetoed by the United
States or any of the Council’s four other permanent members.303 Other international organi-
zations virtually guarantee the United States a slot on specialized organs comprising a subset
of member states. For example, the Executive Council of the International Civil Aviation
Organization comprises thirty-six states, including “States of chief importance in air trans-
port.”304 The Governing Body of the International Labour Organization likewise guarantees
a set number of slots for “member states of chief industrial importance.”305
In any event, the Bank case study does not support the proposition that the United States’
weighted vote at the Bank made Congress more influential than it would have been in an orga-
nization that operated on a one-state, one-vote basis. As parts II and III explain, even after Con-
gress started legislating voting instructions, its influence remained symbolic until it found
other ways to motivate the executive branch. The United States’ weighted vote is incidental to
Congress’s success in influencing the Bank.
Nationality of president. When it comes to the nationality of international organizations’ top
officials, a handful of organizations share the Bank’s tradition. Executive directors of UNICEF
have consistently been U.S. nationals, as have directors-general of the International Organi-
zation for Migration.306 In many international organizations with non-U.S. nationals at the
helm, there is a strong tradition of U.S. nationals one level down. For example, U.S. nationals
are consistently appointed to be first deputy managing director at the IMF, under-secretary-
general at the United Nations, deputy director-general at the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation, deputy director-general at the W TO, and deputy secretary-general at the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development.307 If having U.S. nationals at the highest levels
improves Congress’s ability to influence international organizations, a great many interna-
tional organizations share that feature.
Location of headquarters. Various major international organizations, in addition to the Bank,
have their headquarters in Washington, DC, including the Organization of American States
and the IMF. Others, including the United Nations and some fisheries organizations, are
located elsewhere within the United States. The majority are located abroad. It is hard to see
how geographic location affects Congress’s motivation to influence an international organi-
zation or the likelihood that Congress will see its preferred policies embraced by the executive
branch or adopted by any particular organization. That said, an international organization’s
location in the District of Columbia might affect domestic political dynamics by making the
organization more salient or by facilitating Congress’s ability to monitor it. For example, infor-
mal meetings can be arranged more easily (and cheaply) when they involve travel by taxi rather
303 UN Charter, Arts. 27, 108; IBRD Agreement, supra note 30, Art. VIII. The United States also has the capacity
to veto individual loans made by the Inter-American Bank’s Fund for Special Operations, which, like the IDA,
extends concessional loans on below-market terms. Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development
Bank, Art. IV, §§1, 9, Apr. 8, 1959, 10 UST 3029, 389 UNTS 69.
304 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Art. 50, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 UNTS 295.
305 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Art. 7, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712, TS No. 874.
306 Cogan, supra note 45, at 257, 261.
307 Id. at 257–62.
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than by airplane. Even so, these effects are likely to be marginal. And as international organi-
zations adopt increasingly robust transparency measures and make more information about
themselves available online,308 the difference between Congress’s ability to monitor an
in-town organization versus one headquartered abroad will continue to shrink.
In sum, the United States is an especially influential member of the Bank. The bases of this
influence are widely shared among international organizations or incidental to Congress’s suc-
cesses in shaping Bank policy. They do not suggest significant limits on the generalizability of
the Bank example.
Comparing the World Bank and the IMF
This subsection briefly reviews Congress’s efforts to influence the International Monetary
Fund, and highlights that an international organization’s need for regular appropriations is
central in facilitating congressional influence. The IMF tracks the Bank along all of the dimen-
sions discussed in this subsection except funding. The IMF is, like the bank, a prominent inter-
national financial institution. U.S. participation was authorized by congressional-executive
agreement (in fact, the same legislation that authorized U.S. participation in the IBRD).
Among the IMF’s member states, the United States contributes the largest share of funds, and
its vote is weighted accordingly (16.75 percent of total votes).309 Although the IMF’s managing
director is traditionally a European national, its second-in-command is traditionally an Amer-
ican.310 Finally, the IMF is headquartered a stone’s throw away from the Bank.
As noted above, the IMF’s decisions can directly and significantly affect the bottom line of
banks located in the United States. The volume of legislation that Congress has adopted regard-
ing the IMF suggests that Congress is quite interested in the institution. Over the years, Con-
gress has adopted a wide range of legislative provisions that require the U.S. executive director
of the IMF to use his or her “voice and vote” to achieve (or oppose) a particular end.311 For
example, Congress has directed the secretary of the treasury to instruct the U.S. executive direc-
tor for the IMF to use his or her “voice and vote” to structure IMF programs and assistance “so
that the maintenance and improvement of core labor standards are routinely incorporated as
an integral goal in the policy dialogue with recipient countries.”312 Congress has also required
the U.S. executive director to promote IMF policies that would “facilitat[e] the development
and implementation of internationally acceptable domestic bankruptcy laws and regulations
in developing countries.”313 And yet, one recent study suggested that when it comes to imple-
menting these instructions, “the U.S. executive director is far from a perfect agent of Con-
gress.”314
308 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Kirsch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 38–39 (2005).
309 International Monetary Fund, IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx.
310 Cogan, supra note 45.
311 PATRICIA A. WERTMAN & PAMELA HAIRSTON, THE IMF AND “VOICE AND VOTE” AMENDMENTS: A
COMPILATION (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1998); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra
note 16.
312 22 U.S.C. §262o-2(a)(9) (2006).
313 22 U.S.C. §262o-2(a)(4) (2006).
314 Broz & Hawes, supra note 287, at 103.
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While a more comprehensive study is needed to confirm this observation, this article’s anal-
ysis of the Bank offers reasons to believe that Congress’s efforts to influence the IMF would
be less effective. Like the Bank in its original incarnation—when it consisted of only the
IBRD—the IMF does not require regular infusions of funds from its member states. As a con-
sequence, the IMF can escape Congress’s attention for years at a time. Congressional action is
needed only sporadically—when the IMF needs to increase its lending capacity. At these dis-
crete points in time, Congress has substantial leverage since these increases tend to be large and
are typically responses to urgent international financial crises. But once a crisis is over, Con-
gress’s attention is likely to lapse; it is unlikely to engage in sustained monitoring to determine
how its instructions are implemented. The absence of a need for regular appropriations also
means that Congress lacks the option of cutting off funds should the performance of the IMF
or of the executive branch’s performance there prove lackluster. Finally, the IMF’s operations
are less transparent than the Bank’s,315 which makes it more difficult for members of Congress
to hold informed views about IMF operations and to police the effectiveness of any reforms
undertaken by the IMF in the wake of congressional action. Despite the strong reasons for con-
gressional interest in the actions of the IMF, this article suggests that Congress faces significant
challenges in shaping the executive branch’s interactions with the institution on an ongoing
basis.
More broadly, the IMF example reaffirms the importance of an international organization’s
need for regular funding. Specifically, Congress may have difficulty in influencing interna-
tional organizations that do not require regular funding, even if they address matters that are
salient to members of Congress, participation in the organization was approved by congres-
sional-executive agreement, and the United States exerts disproportionate influence over the
organization. Because it is the rare international organization that does not require regular con-
tributions by its member states, 316 however, this key source of leverage will usually be available
to Congress.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the early 1970s, Congress has established itself as a key player in setting U.S. policy
toward the Bank. Congress does more than put the brakes on executive branch policies with
which it disagrees; it affirmatively shapes the policies that the executive branch pursues. Not-
withstanding its constitutional objections, the executive branch has consistently implemented
at least the letter of Congress’s voting and negotiation instructions. While desultory implemen-
tation of Congress’s legislated instructions remains the most significant threat to their effec-
tiveness, Congress has developed a toolkit that allows it to galvanize executive action. When
it comes to the Bank, Congress has not been sidelined.
Yet the exercise of this influence has not been costless. Threats to cut funding—Congress’s
most effective tool for motivating the executive branch—have sometimes harmed the Bank.
The persistent uncertainty with respect to the size and timing of the United States’ contribu-
tions has required the Bank’s senior management to devote considerable time to securing
bridge financing—time that might otherwise have been devoted to actually running the
315 David Gartner, Uncovering Bretton Woods, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming).
316 ALVAREZ, supra note 3, at 10.
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Bank.317 In addition, Congress’s actions have led the Bank’s other member states, as well as its
management and staff, to complain bitterly about U.S. actions that have unnecessarily polar-
ized and politicized the Bank’s work and undermined its international character.318 The per-
ception that the Bank is unduly catering to the United States makes other states less willing to
support the Bank and to channel development assistance through it rather than through other
institutions.319
Some scholars have argued that catering to the United States is exactly what is needed to
avoid a democratic deficit.320 On this theory, the relevant baseline for evaluating the demo-
cratic accountability of international organizations is the level of control that domestic political
actors have over purely domestic policy, with the consequence that a democratic deficit will
exist unless a state can unilaterally determine outcomes at an international organization.321 But
when states establish an international organization, they by definition share authority to deter-
mine outcomes.322 A conception of democratic accountability that depends on a state’s ability
to singlehandedly determine outcomes at an international organization is literally impossible
for multiple member states to satisfy simultaneously.
What is needed, instead, is a notion of democratic accountability that realistically reflects the
fundamental fact that individual states cannot control international organizations in the same
way that they control their domestic institutions. One possibility is to shift the inquiry from
control over outcomes to control over the positions that each state’s representatives take at
international organizations. Are those positions formulated in a democratically accountable
way? In relation to the Bank, one might ask, for example, whether the positions staked out by
the Treasury Department and U.S. executive director reflect the will of the American people.
As this article demonstrates, the answer is complicated; even a very large quantum of congres-
sional activity does not ensure that this standard is met. Although the Bank has a prominent
profile among international organizations, it is a subject of consistently low salience for the
American public. Neither the president’s election nor the election of individual members of
Congress turns on the candidate’s views regarding the Bank.
Nevertheless, as a consequence of Congress’s ability to shape Bank policy, individual citizens
or, more realistically, organized groups that become interested in the Bank’s work have more
than one channel available through which they can try to influence Bank policy. They can gen-
erate public debate, force the executive branch to publicly defend the positions that it takes,
and potentially shift U.S. policy. When members of Congress embrace a particular view about
what the Bank should or should not be doing, they have powerful tools at their disposal to trans-
late those views into U.S. policy. Congress’s ability to do so has been both overlooked and
undervalued. When it comes to influencing international organizations, Congress is not feck-
less. Congress has more tools, and deploys them much more regularly and successfully, than
the conventional wisdom on foreign affairs suggests.
317 Gwin, supra note 45, at 269.
318 See, e.g., LAVELLE, supra note 28, at 6; Gwin, supra note 45, at 269–70.
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322 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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